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INTRODUCTION 
It is finally over. The Supreme Court‘s incursion into punitive damages 
jurisprudence has unceremoniously ended, but not before the Court, under 
the guise of substantive due process, erected a complex and 
constitutionally dubious set of rules in an effort to fix the heretofore-
intractable multiple punishments problem.
1
 As is often the case, the 
incrementalist approach taken by the Court allowed this conquest to occur 
somewhat quietly. Professor Pamela Karlan observes that ―most 
constitutional law scholars have hardly noticed that the most significant 
innovation in substantive due process during the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Court years‖ has been the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.2 
This ―innovation‖ has been accomplished through an unusual coalition 
of liberal and conservative Justices in the various closely divided decisions 
along the way.
3
 With the addition of four new Justices since the last case 
the Court decided on substantive due process grounds
4—two appointed by 
President George W. Bush and two appointed by President Barack 
Obama—it is unsurprising that many Court followers claim that the status 
of punitive damages jurisprudence is ―unstable and uncertain‖ and that 
what will happen in the future is ―impossible to tell.‖5 As demonstrated in 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and 
Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 406 (1994) (referring to the multiple punishments problem as ―the 
most momentous question as yet unresolved by the Court‖); see also infra note 218. 
 2. Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1087 (2009). 
 3. In fact, of the five current members of the Court who participated in the last case 
purportedly decided on substantive due process grounds, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), Reagan-appointee Justice Anthony Kennedy and Clinton-
appointee Justice Stephen Breyer were in the majority, while the conservative Justices Antonin 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas and the liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg were together in dissent.  
 4. See infra Part IV.C. 
 5. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, How Could the Supreme Court Shift After Stevens?, 
2
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this Article, however, precisely the opposite is true. Contrary to outward 
appearances, a careful review of the Court‘s most recent activity in this 
area—Philip Morris USA v. Williams6—reveals that the Court is almost 
certainly entering an extended silent phase in its punitive damages 
jurisprudence and will not be reviewing any more punitive damages awards 
in the foreseeable future. 
The Court‘s recent foray into punitive damages has, however, left the 
dissenting Justices and punitive damages scholars complaining that the 
Court‘s jurisprudence is ―insusceptible of principled application.‖7 While 
Philip Morris made some progress toward clarifying much of the lingering 
ambiguity,
8
 it still left ample room for continued criticism of whether the 
approach it has adopted is principled. Along the way, however, the Court 
did make significant progress toward addressing its primary animating 
concern with punitive damages—the multiple punishments problem.9 
Simply stated, this problem occurs when ―a defendant, who has injured 
multiple potential plaintiffs by a single act or course of conduct, faces 
multiple punitive damages awards for that conduct.‖10 While this persistent 
problem would be best remedied by Congress,
11
 the Court‘s attempts at a 
fix have led to awkward and highly questionable opinions that expose the 
Court to increasing criticism that its punitive damages jurisprudence 
consists of nothing more than results-oriented, substantive due process 
decisions that simply reflect the individual Justices‘ senses of fairness.12 
                                                                                                                     
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2010, 11:59 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/how-could-the-
supreme-court-shift-after-stevens (basing a conclusion of unpredictability on the fact that three 
Justices who favor the current framework have retired while three who oppose it have not). 
 6. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 7. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 
364 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Supreme Court‘s recent punitive damages 
jurisprudence as ―less than crystalline‖); McClain v. Metabolife Int‘l, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 
1228–29 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (lamenting that while the court delayed ruling on post-judgment motions 
until State Farm was decided, it ―is not sure that the wait was worth it‖ and declaring, ―[T]he court 
is not sure that it fully comprehends all of the possible lessons in State Farm.‖); Jim Gash, Punitive 
Damages, Other Acts Evidence, and the Constitution, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1239 (―By, in 
essence, failing to show his work, Justice Kennedy does guarantee that much ink and effort will be 
expended by lower courts, commentators, and ultimately the Supreme Court in an effort to 
understand and apply the State Farm opinion.‖). 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. See, e.g., Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National 
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1613, 1613–14 (2005) (declaring the multiple 
punishments problem to be ―major and growing‖ and widely recognized as having ―currently no 
satisfactory solution‖); Owen, supra note 1, at 406. 
 10. Gash, supra note 9, at 1613–14. 
 11. Id. at 1644 app. (arguing that federal legislation is necessary to fully and finally resolve 
this problem and offering statutory language that would do just that).  
 12. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 613 n.5 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (observing that the substantive due process question of whether the punitive damages 
award is ―[t]oo big‖ comes down to ―the amount at which five Members of the Court bridle‖). 
3
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Judicial conservatives and punitive damages scholars critical of the 
Supreme Court‘s adverse possession of important aspects of punitive 
damages jurisprudence
13
 had good reason to hope that the substantive due 
process power grab by the Court in the realm of punitive damages would 
be reversed soon after Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito 
were confirmed. They were sorely disappointed, however, when Roberts 
and Alito rejected pleas from, inter alia, conservative stalwarts Antonin 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas urging the Court to butt out of punitive 
damages.
14
 Instead, Roberts and Alito seemed to accelerate the Court‘s 
encroachment by joining the majority in the Court‘s 5–4 decision in Philip 
Morris.
15
 This case was the eighth in a series of closely divided cases over 
the last two decades
16
 whereby the Court constitutionalized this area of 
law, previously reserved to the several states.
17
 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See Stacey Obrecht, Case Note, Punitive Damage Determinations: A Jury‟s Factual 
Inquiry or a Court‟s Mathematical Leash, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408 (2003), 5 WYO. L. REV. 637, 650–51 (2005) (―The State Farm Court has given the opponents 
of ‗activist judges‘ additional ammunition for their arguments because this holding ‗disregard[ed] 
the Court‘s own considered reluctance to expand the open-ended reach of substantive due process 
and hearkens back to the discredited Lochner era of judicial activism.‘ It took the power from the 
states and ‗merely place[d] . . . [the Supreme] Court in the position of a Court of Additional 
Appeals from state courts.‘‖ (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass‘n of Trial Lawyers of Am. in 
Support of the Respondents at 2–3, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003) (No. 01-1289), 2002 WL 31387416)); see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court ―unwisely ventures into territory traditionally within the States‘ 
domain‖); id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[T]he Court‘s activities in [the area of punitive 
damages] are an unjustified incursion into the province of state governments.‖). 
 14. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court Loses Its Unanimity, SLATE 
(Feb. 21, 2007, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2160286 (―For originalists who look to the 
Constitution‘s text, the discovery of limits on punitive damages in the due process clause is of 
dubious pedigree. . . . Yet Roberts and Alito were in the limits-imposing majority. . . . Is it 
disappointing that in this instance Roberts and Alito boarded the Constitution-can-mean-anything 
train? Yes. Every disregard of principle here is likely to be played back elsewhere.‖); see also 
Vikram David Amar, The Supreme Court‟s Recent Philip Morris Punitive Damages Decision: What 
It Reveals About How Constitutional Law Gets Made, and How the Court Functions, FINDLAW‘S 
WRIT (Mar. 2, 2007), http://writ.news/findlaw.com/amar/20070302.html (―Interestingly, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, both of whom—especially Justice Alito—seemed during 
confirmation somewhat skeptical of substantive due process in the abortion and same-sex conduct 
settings, felt comfortable applying (at least a variant of) the concept to strike down the jury award in 
Philip Morris. Perhaps Justice Breyer‘s (not quite convincing, to me) use of the adjective 
‗procedural‘ in his majority opinion allowed these two newcomers to sleep a little easier after 
joining the opinion.‖). 
 15. The majority opinion was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and David Souter. Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg each filed 
separate dissenting opinions, with Thomas and Scalia joining Ginsburg‘s dissent. See Philip Morris 
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 348 (2007). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That 
Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 468 (2005) (―For more than two 
hundred years, the Court deferred to the states‘ choice of substantive, procedural, and evidentiary 
4
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A ray of hope emerged a few months later, however, when the Court 
agreed to review another case (regarding the Exxon Valdez oil spill) 
involving a huge punitive damages award.
18
 But this hope quickly faded 
when the Court strictly limited its review to matters of federal maritime 
law, expressly refusing to evaluate the punitive damages award on due 
process grounds.
19
 
Another ray of hope emerged with the successive retirements of 
Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter, both of whom fully 
subscribed to and supported the Court‘s substantive due process 
jurisprudence. But an examination of the available writings and records of 
President Obama‘s replacements for Stevens and Souter (Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan) reveals no reason to believe that both would 
adopt the view shared by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas that the 
size of punitive damage awards should be left to the states.
20
Although 
Justice Kagan‘s lack of judicial experience makes it impossible to divine 
her jurisprudential methodology with anything approaching certainty,
21
 and 
while Justice Sotomayor‘s track record on punitive damages simply 
reflects her application of Supreme Court precedent without betraying her 
                                                                                                                     
rules for assessing and awarding punitive damages.‖). 
 18. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 552 U.S. 989 (2007) (granting certiorari). 
 19. The petition for certiorari sought review on the following three questions: 
1. May punitive damages be imposed under maritime law against a shipowner 
(as the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits) for the conduct of a ship‘s master at sea, absent a finding that 
the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that conduct, and even when 
the conduct was contrary to policies established and enforced by the owner? 
2. When Congress has specified the criminal and civil penalties for maritime 
conduct in a controlling statute, here the Clean Water Act, but has not provided 
for punitive damages, may judge-made federal maritime law (as the Ninth Circuit 
held, contrary to decisions of the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits) expand 
the penalties Congress provided by adding a punitive damages remedy? 
3. Is this $2.5 billion punitive damages award, which is larger than the total of 
all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal appellate courts in our history, 
within the limits allowed by (1) federal maritime law or (2) if maritime law could 
permit such an award, constitutional due process? 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Exxon, 552 U.S. 989 (No. 07-219), 2007 WL 2383784, at *i. 
The Court limited its review to questions 1, 2, and 3(1) only. Exxon, 552 U.S. 989. 
 20. See infra Part IV.C.2–3.  
 21. See Paul Campos, Blank Slate, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/blank-slate (―Unfortunately, nobody seems to know what 
Kagan‘s views are on most political issues, nor does anyone know what she believes about how 
judges ought to interpret the Constitution, how much deference courts should give to Congress and 
state legislatures, and what role the judiciary should play in checking the powers of the executive 
branch. We don‘t know because she hasn‘t told us.‖). 
5
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personal beliefs,
22
 the fact that the newest Justices are widely viewed as 
left-leaning centrists
23
 makes it highly unlikely that both would choose to 
adopt either Justice Ginsburg‘s atypical (to liberals) line of reasoning24 or 
the approach of famously conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
Accordingly, it is exceedingly unlikely that the addition of Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan will hasten the reversal of the Court‘s substantive 
due process jurisprudence in the punitive damages realm. 
Part I of this Article chronicles and summarizes the development of the 
Supreme Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.25 Over the past two 
decades, the Court has increasingly constitutionalized various aspects of 
punitive damages jurisprudence, using both procedural
26
 and substantive
27
 
due process rationales. A set of three ―guideposts‖ has emerged that courts 
are to use in determining whether a punitive damages award runs afoul of 
constitutional guarantees.
28
 
Part II outlines the multiple punishments problem that is currently 
facing courts throughout the country and provides a brief overview of the 
various failed attempts and current proposals to remedy this problem.
29
 
Part III provides the factual and procedural background of Philip Morris, 
culminating with the Oregon Supreme Court‘s affirmance of the $79.5 
million jury verdict.
30
 
Part III then analyzes and critiques the United States Supreme Court‘s 
opinion in Philip Morris, including Justice Breyer‘s majority opinion and 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See Greg Stohr, Sotomayor on High Court May Mean Looser Limits on Damage 
Awards, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid  
=ay2_LzqaXiQY (―Sotomayor‘s views on damages . . . are largely a mystery, with her few rulings 
on the topic offering limited insight as to how she would rule as a justice. As with other business 
issues, she has eschewed sweeping legal theories, instead taking a case-by-case approach.‖). 
 23. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Memos Reveal Elena Kagan‟s Centrist Side, POLITICO (May 12, 
2010, 4:48 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37119.html (reporting that Kagan 
encouraged President Bill Clinton to take centrist positions during her work in the Clinton 
administration); Steve LeVine & Theo Francis, Sotomayor: A Moderate on Business 
Issues, BUSINESSWEEK (May 26, 2009, 11:12 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnfla  
sh/content/may2009/db20090526_819200.htm (claiming that Sotomayor ―has earned a centrist 
reputation in business cases‖). 
 24. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg‘s federalism concern is atypical of liberal appointees and apparently 
stems from the same methodological concern that prompted her to be critical of Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), claiming that an already-moving political process is preferable to ―[h]eavy-handed 
judicial intervention‖ in establishing a specific substantive due process framework. Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 375, 385–86 (1985). 
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. See infra Part I.C. 
 28. See infra Part I.C.2.a.i–iii. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/2
2011] THE SUPREME COURT (FINALLY) BUTTS OUT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR GOOD 531 
 
the three dissenting opinions, the Oregon Supreme Court‘s ruling on 
remand, and the telling response of the United States Supreme Court to 
Philip Morris‘ subsequent writ of certiorari.31 Part III also briefly analyzes 
Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker and explains why what did not happen 
in that case is quite significant.
32
 
Part IV then deconstructs and reconstructs the Court‘s current punitive 
damages jurisprudence, examining the current makeup of the Court and 
analyzing whether there is reason to believe that the addition of Justices 
Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan might provide any restraining 
influence on the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.33 Part IV then 
concludes that given the balance of power on the Court, and given the 
Court‘s indirect ―fix‖ of the multiple punishments problem, the Court is 
unlikely to take any more punitive damages cases in the near future.
34
 
I.  CONSTITUTIONALIZING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages have long been an important fixture in tort law, 
tracing their origins back to the Code of Hammurabi, which was written 
nearly 4,000 years ago.
35
 Likewise, punitive damages have long been 
accepted as a part of the American common law.
36
 There is universal 
agreement that their purpose is to punish and deter reprehensible conduct.
37
 
These objectives have historically been served exclusively by the states,
38
 
with little or no discussion of federal constitutional considerations, and 
without involvement by the United States Supreme Court. This all changed 
in the late 1980s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See infra Part III.B.2.–D. 
 32. See infra Part III.E. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See infra Part IV.C. 
 35. See Owen, supra note 1, at 368 (explaining that this earliest form of punitive damages 
was calculated through the use of a predetermined scale and called ―multiple damages‖). 
 36. See, e.g., DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 1123–24 (2005). 
 37. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) (citing BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)) (stating that the Court has ―long made clear‖ that a state 
may use punitive damages for the purposes of punishment and deterrence); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1), at 29–30 (5th ed. 2005) (claiming that the most frequent purposes 
of punitive damages cited by courts, legislatures, commentators, and plaintiffs‘ counsel are 
punishment and deterrence). But see Owen, supra note 1, at 373–74 (suggesting a total of five 
objectives of punitive damages: (1) retribution; (2) education; (3) deterrence; (4) compensation; and 
(5) law enforcement). 
 38. See Rustad, supra note 17, at 468 (lamenting that the Court has now federalized the 
punitive damages remedy through its substantive due process jurisprudence after two hundred years 
of deference to the states). 
7
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A.  The Excessive Fines Clause Does Not Apply to Punitive 
Damages 
The first time the Supreme Court grappled at any level with the 
constitutionality of punitive damages was in 1989 in Browning-Ferris 
Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.
39
 In that case, the Court 
was presented with the question of whether a punitive damages award in a 
civil case implicated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.
40
 After reviewing the history and development of the 
Excessive Fines Clause,
41
 the Court concluded that ―[w]hatever the outer 
confines of the Clause‘s reach may be, we now decide only that it does not 
constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government 
neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the 
damages awarded.‖42 As it had done twice previously,43 the Court side-
stepped the question as to whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment imposes any constraints on punitive damages 
awards,
44
 and it concluding that the petitioner had waived this argument by 
failing to raise it below.
45
 
                                                                                                                     
 39. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 40. Id. at 259. The Eighth Amendment provides: ―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
 41. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262–68. 
 42. Id. at 263–64. This language suggests that when the punitive damages award (or a portion 
thereof) goes to the government (as opposed to private litigants), the Excessive Fines Clause might 
be implicated. Accord id. at 298–99 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―I 
also note that by relying so heavily on the distinction between governmental involvement and 
purely private suits, the Court suggests (despite its claim . . . that it leaves the question open) that 
the Excessive Fines Clause will place some limits on awards of punitive damages that are recovered 
by a governmental entity.‖); id. at 275 n.21 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 485 (1989) (―While our opinion in Halper implies that punitive damages awarded to the 
Government in a civil action may raise Eighth Amendment concerns, that case is materially 
different from this one, because the Government was exacting the punishment in a civil action, 
whereas here the damages were awarded to a private party.‖); see also Margaret Meriwether 
Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407, 422–28 
(reviewing the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause); Philip Morris, 549 
U.S. at 359 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―I continue to agree with Justice O‘Connor and those 
scholars who have concluded that the Excessive Fines Clause is applicable to punitive damages 
awards regardless of who receives the ultimate payout.‖). But see Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262 
(―Given that the [Eighth] Amendment is addressed to bail, fines, and punishments, our cases long 
have understood it to apply primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal prosecutions and 
punishments.‖ (emphasis added)); id. at 268 (―[T]he history of the Eighth Amendment convinces us 
that the Excessive Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and 
payable to, the government.‖). 
 43. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828–29 (1986); Banker‘s Life & Cas. 
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76–80 (1988). 
 44. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 259 n.1 (noting that while the petitioners challenged the 
award on due process grounds, the Court declined to reach that issue). 
 45. Id. at 277. Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, however, indicated how 
8
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B.  Procedural Due Process Places Constitutional Limits on 
Punitive Damages Awards 
1.  Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip 
It took only two years for the Court to revisit the issue it declined to 
address in Browning-Ferris. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. 
Haslip,
46
 the Court squarely addressed the question of whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause constrained punitive 
damages awards. In Haslip, the Court explained that because the common 
law approach, whereby the jury‘s initial determination of whether to 
impose punitive damages (and in what amount) was reviewable for 
reasonableness by both trial and appellate courts,
47
 pre-dated the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself,
48
 and because no state or federal court had 
ever found this approach violated due process,
49
 the common law approach 
was not per se unconstitutional.
50
 The Court did caution, however, that 
vesting either the jury or a judge with unlimited discretion in setting a 
punitive damages award could cause ―extreme results that jar one‘s 
constitutional sensibilities.‖51 
                                                                                                                     
they would ultimately resolve this question. See id. at 280 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., 
concurring) (―I join the Court‘s opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for a 
holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases 
brought by private parties.‖). These Justices even previewed the test the Court would eventually 
adopt:  
Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible 
civil damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause 
forbids damages awards that are ―grossly excessive,‖ or ―so severe and oppressive 
as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.‖ 
Id. at 280–81 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 
(1909); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919)); see also 
OWEN, supra note 36, § 18.6, at 1211 & n.92 (citing Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 275 n.21 
(majority opinion); id. at 298–99 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Calvin 
R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 
VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987) (questioning the constitutionality, in light of Browning-Ferris, of 
whether large punitive damages violate the Eighth Amendment); Stephen R. McAllister, A 
Pragmatic Approach to the Eighth Amendment and Punitive Damages, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 761 
(1995). For a discussion of whether it is unconstitutional for the state to take a portion of the 
punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff, see Sharon G. Burrows, Apportioning a Piece of a 
Punitive Damages Award to the State: Can State Extraction Statutes Be Reconciled with Punitive 
Damages Goals and the Takings Clause?, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 437, 455–66 (1992). 
 46. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 47. Id. at 15. 
 48. Id. at 17 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 369–73 (1851)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 18. 
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The Court disclaimed an interest in precisely differentiating between 
―constitutionally acceptable and [] constitutionally unacceptable‖ levels of 
discretion,
52
 observing instead that ―general concerns of reasonableness 
and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury 
properly enter into the constitutional calculus.‖53 The Court then turned its 
attention to the jury instructions given by the trial court and found that they 
appropriately counseled the jury (1) to use punitive damages to punish and 
deter the defendant; and (2) not to use punitive damages to compensate the 
plaintiff for injury.
54
 The Court also found that Alabama‘s post-verdict 
review process comported with due process because it ensured that the 
punitive damages award was ―not grossly out of proportion to the severity 
of the offense and ha[d] some understandable relationship to compensatory 
damages.‖55 
Both Justices Scalia and Sandra Day O‘Connor were sharply critical of 
the Court‘s opinion—Scalia protesting that it went too far,56 and O‘Connor 
objecting that it did not go far enough.
57
As would become a recurring 
theme in the Court‘s punitive damages cases,58 Justice Scalia (though 
concurring in the result of the case) chided the Court for providing 
insufficient guidance to lower courts,
59
 and he offered the following 
prescient lamentation: ―We have expended much ink upon the due-process 
implications of punitive damages, and the fact-specific nature of the 
Court‘s opinion guarantees that we and other courts will expend much 
more in the years to come.‖60 In a lone dissent, Justice O‘Connor 
complained that the lack of ―meaningful standards‖ given to the jury 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 19; see also id. at 20 (―As long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable 
constraints, due process is satisfied.‖). 
 55. Id. at 22. In particular, the Alabama Supreme Court had previously identified its criteria 
for assessing ―whether a punitive award is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and 
retribution.‖ Id. at 21. These criteria were:  
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award 
and the harm likely to result from the defendant‘s conduct as well as the harm that 
actually occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct, 
the duration of that conduct, the defendant‘s awareness, any concealment, and the 
existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the 
defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and 
of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the ―financial position‖ of the 
defendant; (e) all the costs of the litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions 
on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the 
existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these 
also to be taken in mitigation.  
Id. at 21–22. 
 56. Id. at 24–25 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 44 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 58. See, e.g., infra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 59. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 39. 
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violated due process.
61
 Foreshadowing the Court‘s later move into the 
substantive due process realm, Justice O‘Connor criticized the majority 
approach, declaring that Alabama‘s ―standardless discretion to juries is not 
remedied by post hoc judicial review,‖ rather, at best, it ―tests whether the 
award is grossly excessive. This is an important substantive due process 
concern, but our focus here is on the requirements of procedural due 
process.‖62 
2.  Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg
63
 
In what has been described as a ―trivial case,‖64 the Court again 
revisited procedural due process in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
65
 which 
dealt with appellate review of punitive damages awards. In Oberg, the 
Court invalidated as violative of procedural due process an amendment to 
Oregon‘s constitution prohibiting ―judicial review of the amount of 
punitive damages awarded by a jury ‗unless the court can affirmatively say 
there is no evidence to support the verdict.‘‖66 Observing that judicial 
review of the amount of punitive damages has existed for as long as 
punitive damages themselves,
67
 and finding that Oregon‘s minimal review 
of such awards falls dramatically short of the scope of such review 
afforded at common law,
68
 the Court concluded that the essentially 
―unreviewable discretion‖ given to the jury in setting the amount of 
punitive damages was a violation of procedural due process.
69
 
C.  Substantive Due Process Mandates that Punitive Damages Awards 
Not Be Grossly Excessive 
1.  TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 
In a move that has been widely criticized,
70
 the Court veered into the 
realm of substantive due process when it addressed whether a punitive 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 43 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 55–56 (emphasis added). 
 63. Chronologically speaking, this was not the Court‘s next punitive damages case. It is 
analyzed at this point in the Article because, prior to Philip Morris, it was the Court‘s only other 
procedural due process case. 
 64. See OWEN, supra note 36, at 1220. 
 65. 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994). 
 66. Id. (quoting OR. CONST. art.VII, § 3 (amended 1910)). 
 67. Id. at 421. 
 68. Id. at 426–27. 
 69. Id. at 435. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Matthew J. Macario, Constitutional 
Law—Punitive Damage Awards and Procedural Due Process in Products Liability Cases—Honda 
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994), 68 TEMP. L. REV. 409 (1995). 
 70. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 361 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (reiterating his belief that the Constitution does not control the amount of punitive 
damages and that the substantive due process framework is a creation of the Court); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that ―the 
Due Process Clause provides no substantive protections against ‗excessive‘ or ‗unreasonable‘ 
11
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damages award was ―grossly excessive‖ in TXO Production Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp.,
71
 decided only two years after Haslip.
72
 
In TXO, the jury awarded Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages 
and $10 million in punitive damages after finding TXO liable for common 
law slander of title.
73
 On appeal, TXO challenged the constitutionality of 
the punitive damages award, arguing that it violated due process because 
the amount awarded was unconstitutionally excessive.
74
 Relying on a series 
of cases nearly a century old,
75
 the plurality opinion declared that ―grossly 
excessive‖ punitive damages awards violate due process.76 As it had 
previously done in Haslip, the Court again disclaimed an ability to ―‗draw 
a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the 
                                                                                                                     
awards of punitive damages‖ and that the Court‘s jurisprudence in this area ―is insusceptible of 
principled application‖); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470–71 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing his refusal to recognize ―the existence of a so-called ‗substantive 
due process‘ right that punitive damages be reasonable‖ despite his concurrence in the judgment); 
Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1, 10 (2004) (―A federalized democratic system should not tolerate so blatant a usurpation of 
state legislative and judicial prerogatives by an unaccountable federal judicial body.‖); Rustad, 
supra note 17, at 517 (―The constitutionalization of punitive damages is an unprecedented project 
to convince the Court to ‗unmake‘ the tort law remedy of punitive damages.‖); A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1088–89 (2006) (arguing that the Court‘s move to substantive due process 
is unsupported by history and precedent and is inconsistent with principles of construction found in 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments). 
 71. 509 U.S. 443, 446, 454 (1993). 
 72. TXO was the Court‘s next punitive damages case after Haslip. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 73. TXO, 509 U.S. at 446. 
 74. Id. at 452. TXO also sought reversal on the grounds that (1) West Virginia did not 
recognize a claim for slander of title; and (2) admission of out of state conduct to show TXO‘s 
wrongful intent violated West Virginia evidence law. Id.; see also id. at 462 n.28 
(―TXO . . . [further] contend[ed] that the admission of evidence of its alleged wrongdoing in other 
parts of the country, as well as the evidence of its impressive net worth, led the jury to base its 
award on impermissible passion and prejudice.‖). TXO also sought reversal on procedural due 
process grounds. See id. at 446 (―The question we granted certiorari to decide is whether that 
punitive damages award violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, either 
because its amount is excessive or because it is the product of an unfair procedure.‖). 
 75. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919) 
(recognizing some authority that the Due Process Clause limits civil damages awarded pursuant to 
statutory scheme); Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490 (1915) (noting that the 
monetary penalty could not be ―imposed without departing from the fundamental principles of 
justice embraced in the recognized conception of due process of law‖); Standard Oil Co. v.  
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912) (explaining the ability to fix an amount of fines is limited by 
obligation to administer justice); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (―We can 
only interfere with such legislation and judicial action of the States enforcing it if the fines imposed 
are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.‖ 
(citing Coffey v. Harlan Cnty., 284 U.S. 659, 665 (1907))); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Seegers, 207 
U.S. 73, 78 (1907) (―We know there are limits beyond which penalties may not go . . . .‖). 
 76. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458 (pointing out that there was a clear majority of Justices that agreed 
there was a substantive component to the due process clause that limited the size of a punitive 
damages award). 
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constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.‘‖77 Relying upon 
(1) the amount of harm the plaintiff actually suffered; (2) the amount of 
harm that TXO‘s conduct could have potentially caused the plaintiff;78 and 
(3) the wealth and conduct of TXO, the Court concluded that the size of 
the punitive damages award was not ―so ‗grossly excessive‘ as to be 
beyond the power of the State to allow.‖79 
Observing that the case was ―close and difficult,‖80 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy provided the pivotal fifth vote in a separate concurrence, though 
not without articulating his serious concern with the evolution of the 
Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence: 
A reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to 
relying upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction to 
a particular punitive damages award in deciding whether the 
award violates the Constitution. This type of review, far from 
imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury excess, could 
become as fickle as the process it is designed to superintend. 
Furthermore, it might give the illusion of judicial certainty 
where none in fact exists, and, in so doing, discourage 
legislative intervention that might prevent unjust punitive 
awards.
81
 
To Justice Kennedy, TXO‘s ―pattern and practice of fraud, trickery and 
deceit‖82 overcame the massive 524:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive 
damages.
83
 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment 
only.
84
 While Justice Scalia allowed that the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due 
Process Clause ―incorporates certain substantive guarantees specified in 
the Bill of Rights,‖ he steadfastly refused to accept that the Due Process 
Clause ―contains the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive 
punitive damages.‖85 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 458 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)). 
 78. Id. at 460 (―It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the potential harm that the 
defendant‘s conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful plan had succeeded, 
as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar future behavior were 
not deterred.‖). The Court in Philip Morris later clarified that the jury could only consider potential 
harm to the plaintiff, and not to third parties. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 
(2007). 
 79. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462. The Court also summarily dismissed TXO‘s procedural due 
process claim. See id. at 465–66. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Nancy G. Dragutsky, 
Walking the Invisible Line of Punitive Damages: TXO Prod. Corp v. Alliance Res. Corp., 21 PEPP. 
L. REV. 909 (1994). 
 80. TXO, 509 U.S. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 466–67. 
 82. Id. at 468–69 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 890 (W. 
Va. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Id. at 467–68. 
 84. Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 470–71. Justice Scalia further complained,  
13
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Justice O‘Connor, joined by Justices Bryon White and Souter, 
dissented, though not because the plurality had recognized a substantive 
due process right.
86
 To the contrary, Justice O‘Connor made it clear that 
there existed ―common ground that an award may be so excessive as to 
violate due process.‖87 She dissented because she disagreed with the 
plurality‘s method for determining whether such a violation existed and 
from the result reached in the case.
88
 Justice O‘Connor, however, decried 
the plurality‘s failure to ―erect[] . . . a single guidepost to help other courts 
find their way through this area‖89 and accused the plurality of 
―abandon[ing] all pretense of providing instruction and mov[ing] directly 
into the specifics of this case.‖90 Justice O‘Connor further declared: 
Our inability to discern a mathematical formula does not 
liberate us altogether from our duty to provide guidance to 
courts that, unlike this one, must address jury verdicts such as 
this on a regular basis. On the contrary, the difficulty of the 
matter imposes upon us a correspondingly greater obligation 
to provide the most coherent explanation we can.
91
 
2.  BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 
Three years later, the Court responded to Justice O‘Connor‘s plea for 
―guideposts‖ to help lower courts navigate the developing punitive 
damages jurisprudence. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
92
 a 
majority of the Court for the first time seemed to take seriously the 
criticisms leveled by some of its members in prior decisions, particularly 
concerning its failure to provide lower courts with adequate guidance on 
how to apply those decisions.
93
 What ultimately emerged from Gore is the 
                                                                                                                     
It is particularly difficult to imagine that ‗due process‘ contains the substantive 
right not to be subjected to excessive punitive damages, since if it contains that it 
would surely also contain the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive 
fines, which would make the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
superfluous in light of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. 
 86. Id. at 480 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 93. See, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 480 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 466–67 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (explaining that the ―grossly excessive‖ standard is unhelpful and leaves reviewing 
courts to their own subjective reasoning); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 37 
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―[T]he ‗guidance‘ to the jury provided by the admonition that it 
‗take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and 
14
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basic template that both trial and appellate courts now apply when 
determining whether a jury‘s punitive damages award is ―grossly 
excessive.‖ 
In Gore, a doctor sued BMW for fraud and deceptive trade practices in 
Alabama state court after discovering that the ―new‖ BMW he bought from 
a BMW dealer had actually been repainted prior to sale.
94
 BMW admitted 
that the car had been repainted prior to sale and acknowledged its 
nationwide policy of non-disclosure of pre-sale repairs not exceeding 3% 
of the purchase price of the car.
95
 At trial, Dr. Gore sought to focus the jury 
on BMW‘s conduct beyond his individual case and introduced, over 
BMW‘s objections, evidence that BMW had sold 983 cars nationwide as 
―new‖ even though the cars had been repainted prior to sale; fourteen of 
these 983 sales had occurred in Alabama.
96
 Even though BMW introduced 
evidence that its disclosure policy complied with the most stringent 
statutory requirements in the country,
97
 the jury awarded Gore $4,000 in 
compensatory damages
98
 and $4 million in punitive damages.
99
 
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the jury had 
impermissibly calculated the punitive damages award by multiplying 
Gore‘s $4,000 in compensatory damages by the number of cars BMW had 
sold nationwide without disclosing they had been repainted.
100
 The 
Alabama Supreme Court then determined that a constitutionally reasonable 
amount of punitive damages was $2 million and issued a remittitur.
101
 
Declaring that ―a review of this case would help to illuminate ‗the 
character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive 
awards‘ of punitive damages,‖102 the United States Supreme Court granted 
review. 
Writing for a bare five-Justice majority,
103
 Justice Stevens first 
acknowledged that states have ―considerable flexibility‖ in deciding the 
amount of punitive damages allowable in individual cases,
104
 and only 
                                                                                                                     
necessity of preventing similar wrong.‘ That is not guidance but platitude.‖). 
 94. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563. The car had apparently been damaged by acid rain while in transit 
from Germany to the United States. Id. at 563 n.1. 
 95. Id. at 563–64. This policy stemmed from BMW‘s internal survey of state law, which 
revealed that no state statutorily required disclosure of pre-sale repairs costing less than 3% of the 
purchase price of the car. Id. at 565. 
 96. Id. at 564. 
 97. Id. at 565. 
 98. Id. This amount equaled the reduction in value Gore claimed his car suffered due to the 
repainting. Id. at 564. 
 99. Id. at 565. 
 100. Id. at 567. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994)). 
 103. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 
561. 
 104. Id. at 568. 
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when the punitive damages award is ―grossly excessive‖ in relation to the 
state interest sought to be vindicated by the award ―does it enter the zone 
of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.‖105 Therefore, explained Justice Stevens, ―the federal 
excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the 
state interests that a punitive award is designed to serve.‖106 Once the state 
interests are identified, the inquiry then turns to whether the punitive 
damages award is ―grossly excessive‖ in relation to those interests.107 
The Court readily identified and approved of Alabama‘s state interest 
in protecting its citizens from deceptive trade practices.
108
 And if the jury 
had punished BMW only for failing to disclose that Gore‘s car had been 
repainted, or perhaps only for non-disclosure in Alabama, that very well 
might have ended the state interest inquiry. But the jury was instead 
allowed, even encouraged, to punish BMW for each instance in which it 
sold a repainted car as ―new‖ nationwide.109 Because Alabama‘s state 
interest is limited to protecting Alabama citizens, its punishment of 
extraterritorial conduct, the Court decided, impermissibly infringed upon 
the sovereignty of other states.
110
 
This is true, reasoned Justice Stevens, because the wide-ranging, pre-
sale disclosure requirements among the various states
111
 created a 
substantial risk that the Alabama jury‘s punitive damages award based 
upon nationwide sales punished conduct that was actually lawful where it 
occurred.
112
 Inflicting such punishment plainly exceeded a state‘s 
legitimate authority.
113
 ―To punish a person because he has done what the 
law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic 
sort.‖114 Consequently, punitive damages awards ―must be supported by 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 574. 
 108. Id. at 568–69, 573–74. 
 109. Id. at 572–74. In fact, the size of the punitive damages award, $4 million, was almost 
exactly the mathematical product of the amount of compensatory damages awarded Gore ($4,000) 
multiplied by the total number of repainted cars sold as ―new‖ throughout the United States (983). 
Id. at 564. 
 110. Id. at 572–74; see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (―Laws have no 
force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and can have extra-
territorial effect only by the comity of other States.‖). 
 111. Gore, 517 U.S. at 569 n.13. The Court, in footnote 13, summarized a ―patchwork of rules 
representing the diverse policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 states.‖ Id. at 569 n.13, 570. 
 112. Id. at 572–73. 
 113. Id. (―Alabama does not have the power . . . to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful 
where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its residents.‖). 
 114. Id. at 573 n.19 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). The Court 
also noted that not only may Alabama not use punitive damages awards to punish conduct lawful in 
other states, it is also not permitted to use punitive damages ―to deter conduct that is lawful in other 
jurisdictions.‖ Id. at 573 (emphasis added). 
16
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the State‘s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own 
economy.‖115 Having limited the scope of the conduct that could be 
legitimately considered in determining whether the punitive damages 
award was sufficiently tethered to Alabama‘s state interest so as not to be 
―grossly excessive‖ in relation to that interest, the Court then turned its 
attention to the important task of describing how to determine whether the 
award is ―grossly excessive.‖116 
a.  Establishment of Guideposts 
Starting with the premise that a due process challenge to the size of a 
punitive damages award arises out of the defendant‘s claim of lack of 
adequate notice, the Court cobbled together various statements made in 
some of its earlier punitive damages opinions to erect three ―guideposts‖ to 
assist in determining whether a defendant had adequate notice of the fact 
that the conduct engaged in is punishable and that the punishment is 
potentially severe.
117
 If the defendant does not receive adequate notice, 
there may be a due process violation.
118
 The three guideposts the Court 
erected are (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct; 
(2) the ratio between the compensatory damages and punitive damages; 
and (3) the difference between the authorized civil and criminal penalties 
for such conduct and the punitive damages award.
119
 
i.  Degree of Reprehensibility 
With respect to the first guidepost, the Court stated that the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct is the ―most important indicium 
of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award.‖120As guidance for this 
guidepost, the Court enumerated a variety of factors to be considered when 
assessing reprehensibility, including (1) whether the harm suffered was 
economic versus physical; (2) whether the defendant‘s conduct evinced a 
reckless disregard for the health and safety of others; (3) whether the 
conduct was intentional, malicious, deceitful, or performed through 
trickery (as opposed to merely negligently or innocently); (4) whether the 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 572. As found by the Alabama Supreme Court, however, the punitive damages 
award in Gore was ―based in large part on conduct that happened in other jurisdictions.‖ Id. at 573 
(quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 627 (Ala. 1994)). To its credit, the 
Alabama Supreme Court had recognized that such reliance upon extraterritorial conduct was 
improper, and purported to base its remittitur (from $4 million to $2 million) solely upon conduct 
occurring within Alabama. Id. at 573–74. 
 116. Id. at 574. 
 117. Id. at 574–75. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. For a detailed analysis of Gore and its guideposts, see Sabrina C. Turner, Note, The 
Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 427, 438–445. 
 120. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
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target of the conduct was vulnerable; and (5) whether the defendant had 
repeatedly engaged in the conduct while knowing it was wrongful.
121 
ii.  Ratio 
Relying on the ―long pedigree‖ of the ―principle that exemplary 
damages must bear a ‗reasonable relationship‘ to compensatory 
damages,‖122 the second guidepost was the ratio between the size of the 
compensatory damages and the size of the punitive damages.
123
 Adhering 
to its prior rejection of any binding mathematical formula, the Court did 
attempt to provide some additional guidance in distinguishing between 
permissible and impermissible ratios. Generally speaking, offered the 
Court, when compensatory damages are low, it is permissible for the ratio 
to be higher than otherwise would be allowed, and higher ratios are 
constitutionally permissible when either the injury is difficult to detect or 
when monetary damages are difficult to determine.
124
 The Court then 
(unhelpfully) added that when the amount of a punitive damages award is 
―breathtaking,‖ it ―must surely ‗raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.‘‖125 
iii.  Other Sanctions 
The third guidepost instructs courts to evaluate ―the civil or criminal 
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct‖ in relation to 
the size of the punitive damages award at issue.
126
 The rationale behind 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Id. at 575–77. The Court‘s approach to determining whether punitive damages are 
appropriate parallels that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which counsels juries to consider 
―the character of the defendant‘s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the 
defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908(2). The Restatement (Second) approach is followed by most states. See OWEN, supra 
note 36, at 1187. 
 122. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. 
 123. Id. The Court also clarified that the appropriate measure of compensatory damages 
includes not only those actually suffered but also those potentially suffered due to the defendant‘s 
conduct. Id. at 582. This statement by the Court would later become a point of controversy in Philip 
Morris, causing the Court to once again attempt to clarify the scope of potential damages that could 
be considered in calculating the ratio. See infra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 124. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582. 
 125. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993) 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting)); see also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 364 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Supreme Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence as 
―less than crystalline‖). See generally Neil B. Stekloff, Note, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive 
Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Awards After BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1797 
(1997) (arguing that Gore represents an ad hoc, constitutionally unsound decision by the Court); F. 
Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: “Morals Without 
Technique”?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2008) (arguing that the framework the Court introduced in 
Gore ―has made the process less fair and reliable because the Court‘s decisions have shown a lack 
of clarity and consistency, an inadequate basis in terms of theory and policy, and an ad hoc 
approach to the application and construction of the framework.‖). 
 126. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. Later, in State Farm, the Court downplayed the importance of 
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this guidepost is that courts should afford state legislatures a degree of 
deference in setting appropriate penalties for various types of conduct.
127
 
b.  Analysis of Guideposts 
The Court‘s application of the three guideposts to the facts was 
straightforward. With respect to the degree of BMW‘s reprehensibility, the 
Court found BMW‘s conduct to be not particularly reprehensible, noting 
that (1) Gore‘s harm was ―purely economic,‖ and not physical;128 (2) the 
fact that Gore‘s car had been repainted did not affect its safety or 
performance;
129
 (3) BMW‘s failure to disclose was not properly 
characterized as a ―deliberate false statement[]‖;130 (4) while BMW‘s 
nondisclosure policy was intentional, it complied with the strictest state 
disclosure statutes;
131
 and (5) the policy was immediately changed after 
being found wrongful for the first time.
132
 Consequently, the Court 
determined that BMW‘s conduct exhibited ―none of the circumstances 
ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct,‖ and thus ―was 
not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of a $2 million 
exemplary damages award.‖133 
As to the ratio guidepost, the Court hearkened back to an observation 
in Haslip that ―a punitive damages award of ‗more than 4 times the amount 
of compensatory damages‘ might be ‗close to the line‘‖134 as the 
foundation for its conclusion that the 500:1 ratio presented in this case was 
so ―breathtaking‖ as to ―raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.‖135 
Finally, with respect to the comparable sanctions guidepost, the Court 
concluded that BMW had insufficient notice that its nondisclosure policy 
could subject it to a multimillion-dollar punishment because Alabama‘s 
maximum authorized civil penalty for the conduct at issue was a mere 
$2,000.
136
 
                                                                                                                     
criminal penalties by stating that although the existence of a criminal penalty can demonstrate how 
seriously a state considers an act, it has little usefulness in determining dollar amounts. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003). 
 127. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 128. Id. at 576. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 579. 
 131. Id. at 578. 
 132. Id. at 579. 
 133. Id. at 580. 
 134. Id. at 581 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)). 
 135. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481 (1993) 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting)). 
 136. Id. at 584. 
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In light of the preceding application of the guideposts to the facts of 
Gore, the Court, for the first time in its history,
137
 invalidated a punitive 
damages award on substantive due process grounds.
138
 
Though he joined the majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote a separate 
concurrence, explaining that it was ―important to explain why [the State‘s 
entitlement to a strong] presumption of validity [was] overcome in this 
instance.‖139 In his view, the presumption of validity otherwise afforded to 
the award was overcome because the legal standards in place in Alabama, 
as interpreted by the Alabama Supreme Court, ―provided no significant 
constraints or protection against arbitrary results.‖140 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, unsurprisingly wrote a 
blistering dissent, accusing the majority of ―federalizing yet another aspect 
of our Nation‘s legal culture,‖ and adopting a ―new rule of constitutional 
law [that] is constrained by no principle other than the Justices‘ subjective 
assessment of the ‗reasonableness‘ of the award in relation to the conduct 
for which it was assessed.‖141 Justice Scalia also criticized the majority for 
giving ―virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state and federal 
courts, as to what a ‗constitutionally proper‘ level of punitive damages 
might be.‖142 He further mocked that the three guideposts ―mark a road to 
nowhere‖ and ―provide no real guidance at all.‖143 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also filed a 
dissenting opinion,
144
 complaining that the Court improperly invaded state 
territory, offered only vague standards, and characterized the ultimate 
guidance given to lower courts as nothing more than ―a ‗raised eyebrow‘ 
test.‖145 
                                                                                                                     
 137. Id. at 586; id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―[T]oday‘s judgment represents the first 
instance of this Court‘s invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as simply unreasonably 
large . . . .‖); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430–31 (2003) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (noting that Gore was the first time the Court ―invalidated a state-court punitive 
damages assessment as unreasonably large‖). 
 138. The Court found that while both compensatory and punitive damages were justified in 
this case, the $2 million punitive damages award was grossly excessive in relation to the state 
interest the award was designed to serve. Gore, 517 U.S. at 585. For an interesting economic 
analysis of the reasonableness of the jury‘s punitive damages award in Gore, see A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 
901–02 (1998) (concluding that the award was grossly excessive). 
 139. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586–87 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices O‘Connor and Souter joined 
Justice Breyer‘s concurrence. Id. at 586. 
 140. Id. at 588. This could, in fact, be an attempt by Justice Breyer to add a procedural due 
process element to the analysis, foreshadowing his majority opinion in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007). 
 141. Gore, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 602. 
 143. Id. at 605. 
 144. Id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 612–13. Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have grown more 
comfortable with this substantive due process approach over time, as he joined the majority opinion 
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3.  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell 
The Court‘s first opportunity to apply the guideposts it announced in 
Gore came in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell,
146
 a Utah case involving a bad faith claim arising out of a car 
accident. In State Farm, Curtis Campbell caused an accident that killed one 
and seriously injured another.
147
 In the ensuing wrongful death and 
personal injury lawsuits against its insured, State Farm contested liability 
and refused to settle the claims for Campbell‘s policy limits, even though 
Campbell was clearly at fault.
148
 As expected, the jury found Campbell 
liable and awarded the plaintiffs nearly $200,000.
149
 Though they had 
previously promised otherwise,
150
 State Farm initially refused to pay the 
amount of the award that exceeded the policy limits,
151
 instead advising the 
Campbells to sell their house to pay the excess judgment.
152
 
Though ultimately State Farm agreed to pay the judgment in full,
153
 in 
the meantime, the Campbells reached a settlement with the plaintiffs in the 
underlying suit whereby the Campbells agreed to pursue a bad faith claim 
against State Farm and to pay the plaintiffs most of what was recovered in 
such an action.
154
 In exchange, the plaintiffs agreed not to collect on the 
verdict against the Campbells.
155
 
In the ensuing bad faith case, the trial court bifurcated the trial into two 
different phases, with the first phase focusing upon whether State Farm had 
acted in bad faith in the underlying case.
156
 The second phase, if necessary, 
would decide the amount of compensatory and punitive damages, if any, 
that would be awarded to the Campbells.
157
 During discovery, the 
Campbells gathered evidence of other alleged bad acts by State Farm, 
                                                                                                                     
striking down a punitive damages award on substantive due process grounds in State Farm. See 
infra note 169. 
 146. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 147. Id. at 412–13. In the accident, Todd Ospital was killed and Robert Slusher was 
permanently disabled, though Campbell and his wife were uninjured. Id. 
 148. Id. at 413. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. State Farm had previously assured the Campbells that ―their assets were safe, that they 
had no liability for the accident, that [State Farm] would represent their interests, and that they did 
not need to procure separate counsel.‖ Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Campbell v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. Id. The Campbells‘ policy provided that State Farm would pay up to $50,000, leaving the 
Campbells responsible for the remainder of the award. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 414. 
 154. Id. at 413–14.  
 155. Id. at 413. Specifically, the Campbells agreed to pay the plaintiffs 90% of what was 
recovered in the bad faith action and to allow the plaintiffs to play a major role in the decision 
making in the bad faith case. Id. at 413–14. 
 156. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001). 
 157. Id. 
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many of which were outside of Utah.
158
 The trial court granted State 
Farm‘s motion to exclude this evidence from Phase I of the trial159 but 
ruled that it could be admitted in Phase II if Phase II proved necessary.
160
 
In Phase I, the jury found that State Farm‘s decision not to settle the 
underlying case was unreasonable given the likelihood of a verdict in 
excess of the Campbells‘ policy limits.161 In Phase II, State Farm 
contended that its decision to take the underlying case to trial was an 
―honest mistake.‖162 In contrast, the Campbells argued that State Farm‘s 
decision was part of a ―national scheme‖ to defraud its policy holders and 
to support their claim, thus presented evidence of numerous acts 
committed by State Farm nationally.
163
 This evidence was admitted 
pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
164
 which is 
substantially identical to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
165
 
At the close of Phase II, ―[t]he jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in 
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.‖166 Though 
―the trial court reduced [the damages] to $1 million and $25 million, 
respectively,‖ the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million punitive 
damages award after applying the guideposts previously announced in 
Gore.
167
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the $145 
million award was grossly excessive.
168
 Writing for the six-member 
majority,
169
 Justice Kennedy declared the case to be ―neither close nor 
difficult.‖170 Apparently dispensing with Gore‘s directive to carefully 
identify and define Utah‘s governmental interest in the case,171 Justice 
                                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 1143. 
 159. Id. at 1156. The trial court carefully examined this evidence over the course of fifteen 
days in conjunction with no less than ten pretrial hearings. See id. at 1157. 
 160. Id.  
 161. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414. Between Phases I and II, the Supreme Court decided BMW 
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). State Farm, 538 U.S. at 14. State Farm again 
moved to exclude the evidence of other acts that occurred outside of Utah but was once again 
denied. Id. 
 162. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1143. 
 163. Id. at 1143. 
 164. UTAH R. EVID. 404(b); Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1157. 
 165. UTAH R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee‘s note; see also Gash, supra note 7, at 1226 
n.293. 
 166. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 415.  
 167. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–575 (1996)). The 
compensatory damages remained at $1 million. Id. at 426. 
 168. Id. at 429. 
 169. Id. at 411. Joining Justice Kennedy were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, 
O‘Connor, Souter, and Breyer. Id. 
 170. Id. at 418. This language is apparently used to contrast State Farm with TXO, in which 
Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote in favor of affirming the punitive damages award, even 
while describing that case as both ―close and difficult.‖ TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 
509 U.S. 443, 468–69 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 171. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 571 (―[J]udicially imposed punitive damages . . . must be supported 
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Kennedy delved directly into the three guideposts identified in Gore. In the 
context of the reprehensibility analysis, Justice Kennedy reiterated what 
was made clear in Gore: ―A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct 
that may have been lawful where it occurred.‖172 Unlike in Gore, however, 
the Campbells conceded that much of the conduct reflected in the evidence 
introduced in the bad faith case was lawful where it occurred.
173
 
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy rendered moot the lawful/unlawful 
distinction, the importance of which had been left uncertain in Gore,
174
 by 
declaring ―[n]or, as a general rule does a State have a legitimate concern in 
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts 
committed outside of the State‘s jurisdiction.‖175 Using principles of 
federalism as the foundation, Justice Kennedy declared that ―each State 
may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or 
proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine what 
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within 
its jurisdiction.‖176 Therefore, whether or not the extraterritorial conduct 
was lawful or unlawful is irrelevant—the only conduct for which State 
Farm could be legitimately punished in Utah state court is conduct that 
took place in Utah. Unfortunately, however, this pronouncement did not 
fully dispense with the case.
177
 
Because the evidence introduced in Phase II of the bad faith case was 
admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b), which allows for introduction of other 
acts that are probative of, for example, motive or intent,
178
 the Court was 
still faced with determining whether this evidence was admitted for 
purposes other than punishment of State Farm. Though not clearly framed 
by the Court, the simple question it had to decide was whether  the 
evidence of other acts was used to ascertain the level of reprehensibility of 
State Farm‘s conduct vis-à-vis the Campbells, or was, instead, used to 
punish State Farm.
179
 Justice Kennedy encountered little difficulty in 
determining that ―[t]his case . . . was used as a platform to expose, and 
punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm‘s operations throughout 
the country.‖180 While acknowledging that even ―[l]awful out-of-state 
                                                                                                                     
by the State‘s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own economy.‖); supra notes 106–07 
and accompanying text. 
 172. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 572). 
 173. Id. at 422. 
 174. See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text; see also Gash, supra note 7, at 1234. 
 175. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 422 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 569). This means, of course, that a punitive damages 
award of any size that punishes a defendant for extraterritorial acts is per se unconstitutional as a 
violation of federalism principles. Such a violation could, however, still be harmless error. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Gash, supra note 7, at 1234. 
 180. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 420; see also id. (―The Utah Supreme Court‘s opinion makes 
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conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and 
culpability of the defendant‘s action in the State where it is tortious,‖181 
Justice Kennedy insisted that such conduct ―must have a nexus to the 
specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.‖182 
Of critical importance to the later-decided Philip Morris case (and 
more generally), Justice Kennedy then acknowledged, albeit somewhat 
obliquely, that the lurking presence of the multiple punishments problem
183
 
was driving the decision. In the wake of his discussion of why principles of 
federalism prohibit state courts from punishing extraterritorial conduct, 
Justice Kennedy seized hold of what he characterized as ―a more 
fundamental reason‖ for the decision.184 A full understanding and 
appreciation of this ―reason‖ that is ―more fundamental‖ than federalism is 
critical to an understanding of the Philip Morris case decided a few years 
later. 
Justice Kennedy began with the implied (though mistaken) premise 
that only prior bad acts that are similar to the conduct at issue in the case 
can be properly admitted as other acts evidence.
185
 Consequently, reasoned 
Justice Kennedy, dissimilar acts cannot serve as the basis for a punitive 
damages award.
186
 His explicit rationale for this conclusion was that ―[a] 
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not 
for being an unsavory individual or business.‖187 Adding a constitutional 
exclamation point, Justice Kennedy continued: ―Due process does not 
permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the 
merits of other parties‘ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the 
                                                                                                                     
explicit that State Farm was being condemned for its nationwide policies rather than for the conduct 
directed toward the Campbells.‖); id. (―[T]he Campbells introduced evidence that State Farm‘s 
decision to take the case to trial was a result of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by 
capping payouts on claims company wide.‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Campbell v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. 
(―This was, as well, an explicit rationale of the trial court‘s decision in approving the award.‖); id. 
(―[T]he Campbells demonstrated, through the testimony of State Farm employees who had worked 
outside of Utah, and through expert testimony, that this pattern of claims adjustment under the 
PP&R program was not a local anomaly, but was a consistent, nationwide feature of State Farm‘s 
business operations, orchestrated from the highest levels of corporate management.‖ (alteration in 
original) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 120a, State Farm, 538 U.S. 408 (No. 01-1289) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 181. Id. at 422. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See generally infra Part II. 
 184. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422–23. 
 185. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422 (―A defendant‘s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts 
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.‖); id. at 423 
(―[E]vidence of other acts need not be identical to have relevance in the calculation of punitive 
damages . . . .‖); see also Gash, supra note 7, at 1246 (explaining that the language of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b) ―does not require other acts to be similar in order to be admissible . . . because 
other acts are occasionally highly probative for a proper purpose even in the absence of similarity‖). 
 186. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422–23. 
 187. Id. at 423. 
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guise of the reprehensibility analysis . . . .‖188 Due process does not allow 
this, declared Justice Kennedy, because ―[p]unishment on these bases 
creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same 
conduct.‖189 As authority for this critically important constitutional 
pronouncement, Justice Kennedy cited a concurrence in Gore written by 
Justice Breyer
190—the author of the majority opinion in Philip Morris.191 
Concluding that the Campbells were unable to identify much, if any, 
evidence of repeated misconduct that was similar to that which injured 
them,
192
 Justice Kennedy declared the conduct that harmed the Campbells 
to be ―the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis.‖193 And 
while finding State Farm‘s handling of the Campbells‘ case justified an 
award of punitive damages, Justice Kennedy concluded that a ―more 
modest‖ award would have satisfied Utah‘s legitimate interests.194 
Foreshadowing its decision in Philip Morris, the Court also explained 
that in order to prevent a jury from using evidence of out-of-state conduct 
to punish a defendant, it must be instructed on the proper use of such 
evidence.
195
 
On the second Gore guidepost, the Court once again disclaimed an 
interest in drawing a bright line between the constitutionally permissible 
and impermissible ratios between punitive damages and compensatory 
damages.
196
 The Court did, however, come closer than it ever previously 
had to drawing such lines, declaring that ―few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant 
degree, will satisfy due process.‖197 Backpedaling a bit, the Court allowed 
that such ratios (1) can be higher when particularly reprehensible conduct 
causes only modest compensatory damages, and (2) may not 
constitutionally exceed even a one to one ratio when compensatory 
damages are substantial.
198
 Because the punitive damages award in this 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring)). 
 191. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007). 
 192. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423. 
 193. Id. at 424. 
 194. Id. at 419–20. 
 195. Id. at 422. 
 196. Id. at 424–25 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996); TXO 
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993)). 
 197. Id. at 425. 
 198. Id. 
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case was 145:1,
199
 there was a strong presumption against its constitutional 
validity.
200
 
With respect to the final guidepost, the Court noted that it ―need not 
dwell long‖ on it because ―[t]he most relevant civil sanction‖ in Utah was a 
$10,000 sanction for fraud.
201
 When the conduct under consideration was 
limited to that which harmed the Campbells, the Court concluded that a 
single fine of $10,000 was ―dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages 
award.‖202 
When the conduct at issue was properly limited to that which harmed 
the Campbells, the Court concluded that each of three guideposts pointed 
toward a punitive damages award in the ballpark of the $1 million 
compensatory damages award.
203
Accordingly, the Court reversed and 
remanded the case to the Utah courts.
204
 
Justice Scalia was brief (but not kind) in dissent, pronouncing the 
Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence to be ―insusceptible of principled 
application.‖205 Justice Thomas also filed a brief dissent, reiterating his 
view that ―‗the Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive 
damages awards.‘‖206 Justice Ginsburg filed a more substantial opinion in 
dissent, taking issue with the Court‘s recitation of the facts and its 
application of the Gore guideposts.
207
 
As demonstrated below, the prospect of defendants having to pay 
multiple punitive damages awards for the same act or course of conduct 
has been the driving force behind the Supreme Court‘s recent substantive 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Id. at 426. While the jury‘s verdict originally consisted of $2.6 million in compensatory 
damages and $145 million in punitive damages, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court‘s 
reduction of the compensatory damages to $1 million. Id. at 408, 420, 426. 
 200. Id. at 426. 
 201. Id. at 428 (stating that a comparison to criminal penalties has little usefulness in 
determining dollar amounts but that the existence of a criminal penalty does demonstrate how 
serious a state considers an act).  
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 429. 
 204. Id. On remand, the Supreme Court of Utah reduced the punitive damage award to 
approximately $9 million, utilizing the maximum nine-to-one ratio that the Supreme Court seemed 
to allow in State Farm. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 410 (Utah 2004). 
As was instructed by the Supreme Court in State Farm, the Utah Supreme Court based its award 
solely on State Farm‘s ―behavior that affected the Campbells and took place within Utah.‖ Id. at 
413. The United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari filed following the Utah case. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 98 P.3d 409 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 874 (Oct. 
4, 2004) (No. 04–116). 
 205. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 206. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 
532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 207. See id. at 430–39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, Ginsburg emphasized the details 
of State Farm‘s wrongdoing and agreed with the Utah Supreme Court that State Farm‘s conduct was 
―egregious and malicious.‖ Id. at 436. She further took issue with the Court‘s dismissal of these 
relevant facts. Id. at 437. Unlike in Gore, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not join Justice 
Ginsburg‘s dissent. Id. at 430. 
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due process punitive damages jurisprudence. Indeed, as demonstrated in 
Part III, the so-called ―multiple punishments problem‖ directly led to the 
questionable opinion in Philip Morris.
208
 Accordingly, a full understanding 
of the nature and extent of this problem is vital to understanding Philip 
Morris and why this author is convinced that the Supreme Court is done 
tinkering with punitive damages. 
II.  THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS PROBLEM
209
 
State and federal courts, state and federal legislatures, a substantial 
number of legal commentators, and countless lawyers representing both 
plaintiffs and defendants all recognize that our torts system has a major 
problem—how to deal with the multiple punishments problem.210 This 
topic has prompted (1) a great number of majority and dissenting opinions 
in both state
211
 and federal
212
 courts; (2) a wide variety of publications, 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See infra Part III. 
 209. This problem is also occasionally referred to as ―the multiple punitive damages problem.‖ 
See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for 
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1032 n.123 (1999). 
 210. For a comprehensive analysis of this problem and a proposed comprehensive solution, see 
generally Gash, supra note 9. Much of the discussion and many of the citations in this section 
outlining the contours of this problem closely resembles my earlier research on this subject 
contained in the cited article.  
211. See, e.g., Ex parte Holland, 692 So. 2d 811, 816–19 (Ala. 1997) (pointing out the 
potential for the first plaintiff in a multiple-claimant tort case to impair the ability of the remaining 
members to protect their interests but refusing to use mandatory class actions to deal with the 
problem); Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, 69 P.3d 965, 972 (Cal. 2003) 
(recognizing the unfairness of multiple punishment and suggesting a ―non-opt out‖ class action 
solution); Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 397, 403 (Ill. 1990) (expressing concern 
for the imposition of multiple punitive damages and its effect on manufacturers and their economic 
contributions to society); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa 
1994) (recognizing the seriousness of multiple punitive damages and calling for a national 
solution); Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 478, 480 (N.J. 1986) (stating there 
should be safeguards against multiple punitive damages, including offering evidence of prior 
punitive damages award to the jury); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 
48 (Tex. 1998) (holding that other impositions of punitive damages should be considered when 
assessing punitive damage awards but stopping short of declaring multiple punitive damages 
unconstitutional); Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Life Ins. Co., 600 S.E.2d 346, 361 (W. Va. 2004) 
(discussing the potential problems with multiple impositions of punitive damages); Wangen v. Ford 
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457–61 (Wis. 1980) (emphasizing the need for close judicial control 
of multiple punitive damages awards).  
 212. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386 (3d Cir. 1993) (―[B]oth state and federal 
courts have recognized that no single court can fashion an effective response to the national 
problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products.‖), modified, 13 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1989) (declaring that a national rule on the 
issue of multiple punitive damages is necessary); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 
832, 841–42 (2d Cir. 1967) (explaining the problem of multiple punitive damages and recognizing 
courts‘ limits in solving the problem); In re N. Dist. of Calif. ―Dalkon Shield‖ IUD Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 895, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (pointing out ―[t]he potential abuse 
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including law review articles from leading commentators;
213
 (3) numerous 
state statutes;
214
 (4) multiple failed attempts at federal legislation;
215
 and 
(5) a telling note of caution from the United States Supreme Court.
216
 
                                                                                                                     
implicit in repeated awards of punitive damages‖), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th 
Cir. 1982); McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1569–70 (M.D. Ga. 1990) 
(struggling with a resolution to the multiple punitive damages against the same defendant); 
Campbell v. ACandS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D. Mont. 1989) (―[T]he continued imposition 
of punitive damages serves no purpose within the contemplation of the statutory or common law of 
Montana authorizing punitive damages.‖); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 
1234–35 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding that multiple punitive damages violate due process in certain 
circumstances); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp, 717 F. Supp. 272, 284–85 (D.N.J. 1989) 
(recognizing that ―awarding exemplary damages in successive asbestos litigations are thus 
nationwide problems and call for a uniform solution.‖); In re ―Agent Orange‖ Prod. Liab. Litig, 100 
F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (calling for a limit on the amount of times one defendant can be 
punished for a single act or course of conduct), aff‟d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Maxey v. 
Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (recognizing the problem with 
unlimited exemplary damages in the design defect context), modified, reh‟g denied, 727 F.2d 350, 
353 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 213. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 13 (4th ed. 1971) 
(warning that the multiple punitive damages problem ―might well lead to a re-examination of the 
whole basis and policy of awarding punitive damages‖); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple 
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 583, 594 (2003) (―Numerous commentators have bemoaned this risk of unfair piling on, 
dubbing it the ‗multiple punishment‘ problem.‖); Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater Fairness 
When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 931, 932–34 (describing the multiple punitive damages problem and pointing out the 
inadequacy of any single court or state legislature to combat it); Gash, supra note 9, at 1624–26 
(arguing that the effects of the multiple punishments problem may include bankruptcy of 
defendants, under compensation of future plaintiffs, and ill effects to employees and stockholders of 
the defendant company); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986) (recognizing the threat multiple punitive damage awards 
pose on the viability of business entities); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive 
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44–47, 50 (1982) 
(explaining the problems of measurement and control of punitive damages especially in products 
liability litigation); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the 
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 51–52 (1983) (discussing 
the emergence and existing problem of multiple punitive damages); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The 
Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 285 (1983) 
(bemoaning the lack of jury instruction and cogent standards for assessing punitive damages). 
 214. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)(a)–(b) (2010) (disallowing punitive damages in 
situations where the defendant has previously been assessed punitive damages for the same act or 
single course of conduct, except when the court determines the prior award was insufficient 
punishment); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2011) (allowing only one award of punitive 
damages for any act or omission arising from products liability); MINN. STAT. § 549.20(3) (2010) 
(using other punitive and compensatory awards against a defendant as a factor in determining a 
punitive damage award); MO. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (West 2010) (requiring that defendant be 
credited with a prior punitive damage award by the amount previously paid for the same conduct); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B)(7) (LexisNexis 2011) (directing that when assessing punitive 
damage awards, courts consider the total effect of other punitive damages award against the same 
defendant for the same conduct giving rise to the claim); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(3) (2009) 
28
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Judge Henry Friendly first identified and articulated the multiple 
punishments problem in the 1960s, recognizing that ―[t]he legal difficulties 
engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part of hundreds of 
plaintiffs are staggering.‖217 Nearly a half century later, the problem 
remains every bit as ―staggering‖ in breadth. Professor David Owen, a 
leading commentator on punative damages, identified the question of 
whether due process restrains multiple punitive damages awards as ―the 
most momentous question as yet unresolved by the Court.‖218 Utah Senator 
Orrin Hatch, an outspoken proponent of tort reform, has declared the 
multiple punitive damages problem ―one of the most egregious and 
unconscionable . . . abuses and excesses in our civil justice system.‖219 
Even Professor Laurence Tribe, an equally outspoken supporter of punitive 
damages,
220
 confesses that due process ought to limit the recovery of 
                                                                                                                     
(directing that when reviewing punitive damage awards, courts consider previous judgments for 
punitive damages against the same defendant for the same conduct giving rise to the claim).  
 215. An early attempt to introduce punitive damages reform occurred in 1984. See Product 
Liability Act: Hearing on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Committee on 
Commerce Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong. 28 (1983). Members of the American Bar 
Association criticized this proposal declaring, ―[W]e have rejected much more radical suggestions 
that have been made, such as allowing only one punitive damages award and then deeming the 
company sufficiently punished. Such a provision was at one time part of proposed federal product 
legislation but eventually dropped as patently unfair, since the first verdict might be a small one or 
one maneuvered by the defendant.‖ SPECIAL COMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES SEC. OF LITIG., AMER. 
BAR ASS‘N., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION 7-2 (1986) [hereinafter A.B.A. 
REPORT] (citing the 1984 proposal). Still, later attempts were unsuccessfully made. See Multiple 
Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1995, S. 671, 104th Cong. (1995); Multiple Punitive Damages 
Fairness Act of 1997, S. 78, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 216. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (strongly 
implying that due process imposes limits on multiple punitive damages awards). 
 217. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967). 
 218. Owen, supra note 1, at 406; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 612 
n.4 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (confirming the open status of the multiple punishment 
problem by saying, ―Petitioner invites the Court to address the question of multiple punitive 
damages awards stemming from the same alleged misconduct. The Court does not take up the 
invitation, and rightly so, in my judgment, for this case does not present the issue.‖); Colby, supra 
note 213, at 587 (characterizing the multiple punishment problem as ―the single most discussed and 
debated issue in the law of punitive damages‖); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as 
Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 432 (2003) (―The multiple punishments problem has 
confounded jurists and scholars for the better part of the past three decades.‖); Victor E. Schwartz 
& Leah Lorber, Death by a Thousand Cuts: How to Stop Multiple Imposition of Punitive Damages, 
BRIEFLY . . . : PERSP. ON LEGIS, REG, AND LITIG, Dec. 2003, at 1, 8–9 (―A major problem in our 
liability system is the multiple imposition of punitive damages.‖). 
 219. 143 CONG. REC. S454 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
 220. Professor Tribe has argued numerous cases in support of punitive damages awards. See, 
e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–35, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 583 U.S. 
408 (2003) (No. 01-1289) (arguing for the respondent that punitive damages were not excessive); 
Transcript of Oral Argument, Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (No. 93-644), 
1994 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 150, at *30–31 (arguing for respondents seeking to uphold the punitive 
damage award); Transcript of Oral Argument, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 
443 (1993) (No. 92-479), 1993 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 178, at *25–26 (arguing for respondents seeking 
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multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct through ―some 
double jeopardy-like doctrine.‖221 The American Law Institute,222 the 
American Bar Association,
223
 and the American Association of Trial 
Lawyers have all gone on the record agreeing that this is a significant 
problem.
224
 Nevertheless, the solution to this ongoing problem has proven 
elusive.
225
 There is a clear consensus that any comprehensive solution must 
be accomplished on a national, rather than state, level.
226
 
The multiple punishments problem has only emerged in the latter half 
of the 20th Century because it was during this time that legal and 
technological changes combined to give rise to the modern mass tort claim. 
By definition, the multiple punishments problem can only arise when the 
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards against a defendant for a 
                                                                                                                     
to uphold the punitive damage award). 
 221. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, State Farm, 583 U.S. 408 (No. 01-1289) 
(colloquy between Justice Stevens and Professor Tribe). 
 222. 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS‘ STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 
260–65 (1991). 
 223. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 215, at 7-1. 
 224. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 20–26 (1989). 
 225. See Owen, supra note 1, at 383 (lamenting that, ―[T]his very serious problem of repetitive 
punitive damage awards remains to date a problem without a satisfactory judicial or legislative 
resolution.‖). For a thorough discussion of this problem and a proposed comprehensive solution to 
this problem, see generally Gash, supra note 9. 
 226. See, e.g., Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1386 (3d Cir. 1993) (―[B]oth state and federal 
courts have recognized that no single court can fashion an effective response to the national 
problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products.‖), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58, 62 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 1989) (declaring that a national 
rule on the issue of multiple punitive damages is necessary); Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp, 717 
F. Supp. 272, 284–85 (D.N.J. 1989) (recognizing that ―awarding exemplary damages in successive 
asbestos litigations are thus nationwide problems and call for a uniform solution‖); In re N. Dist. of 
Calif. ―Dalkon Shield‖ IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 895, 899–900 (N.D. Cal. 1981) 
(discussing the potential for abuse implicit in a multiplicity of punitive damages awards and calling 
for nationwide solution to remedy this abuse), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 
1982); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 865 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing 
the seriousness of multiple punitive damages and calling for a national solution); Multiple Punitive 
Damages Fairness Act of 1997,  S. 78, 105th Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REC. S454 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 
1997) (―The only effective means of addressing these problems is through a nationwide solution, 
which the legislation I introduce today would provide.‖) (Statement of Sen. Hatch); A.B.A. REPORT, 
supra note 215, at 7-2, 7-8 (concluding that national legislation is needed with respect to the 
multiple punitive damages problem); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, supra note 224, at 20–21 
(calling for a national solution to the problem); Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 218, at 10, 17–20 
(―[A] uniform remedy for the problems posed by multiple punitive damages awards can be 
effectively achieved only at the federal level . . . .‖); Denemark, supra note 213, at 932–33 
(proposing common law solution from the judiciary); Owen, supra note 1, at 406 n.152 (―In the 
absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower courts continue to struggle with the problem as best they 
can.‖); Owen, supra note 213, at 50 (arguing for increased judicial control over  multiple punitive 
damages awards); Wheeler, supra note 213, at 276 (bemoaning the absence of clear Supreme Court 
guidance on ―whether the procedures by which punitive damages have been awarded to private 
plaintiffs satisfy the dictates of due process‖). 
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single act or course of conduct exists. In the vast majority of tort cases, one 
plaintiff sues one defendant for injuries arising out of the defendant‘s 
actions; for example, a car accident.
227
 Even if the defendant‘s conduct is 
sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to punitive damages, once the 
underlying case is resolved, the defendant cannot be sued or otherwise 
punished civilly again for that same conduct. It is only when a defendant‘s 
act or course of conduct injures multiple plaintiffs that the defendant is 
exposed to the risk of multiple lawsuits and multiple punitive damages 
awards. While it cannot be questioned that there were cases involving 
multiple punitive damages awards prior to the latter half of the 20th 
Century,
228
 those awards were very unusual and did not raise the level of 
concern that such awards now raise. The largest factor in the substantial 
rise in the number of cases implicating the multiple punishments problem 
was the advent of products liability and other mass tort claims.
229
 
One of the largest and most controversial types of mass tort claims 
involves the potential liability of tobacco manufacturers for the injuries and 
deaths of thousands, if not millions, of cigarette smokers. Though brought 
as an individual action in the wake of the death of a cigarette smoker, the 
case of Philip Morris USA v. Williams
230
 has deep and far-reaching 
consequences for mass tort law; it also placed before the United States 
Supreme Court, once again, the multiple punishments problem.  
III.  PHILIP MORRIS USA V. WILLIAMS 
Philip Morris USA v. Williams arose when the widow and personal 
representative of Jesse Williams‘ estate (Williams) brought an action 
against cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris, Inc., seeking compensatory 
and punitive damages for the death of her husband.
231
  
                                                                                                                     
 227. See Seltzer, supra note 213, at 40 (―Typically, punitive damages claims arose from a 
single incident involving only two parties, making it possible for a jury to determine an appropriate 
award without considering the possibility of additional awards by other juries.‖). Accord Owen, 
supra note 213, at 15 (―Punitive damages were developed largely as a punishment and deterrent for 
trespassers, oxen thieves and other such human malefactors. When the device is transferred to the 
complex bureaucracy of a modern manufacturing concern, the fit is awkward in many respects.‖); 
cf. Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 218, at 2 (―Multiple punishment for the same or similar conduct 
did not exist at the time the Constitution was drafted and certainly cannot be sustained on the 
grounds of ‗historical correctness.‘‖). 
 228. See, e.g., Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 291, 294 (Iowa 1917) (affirming punitive 
damages awards in favor of both a young woman seduced by the defendant and her father and 
declaring that, ―The fact that a defendant has or may be held liable for exemplary damages in one 
case has never been held as a defense in his favor against liability for exemplary damages to another 
plaintiff.‖); Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wisc. 1914) (affirming punitive damages awards in 
favor of both a young woman seduced by the defendant and her father). 
 229. The first series of products liability lawsuits to gain national attention occurred in the 
1960s and involved a drug used to treat arteriosclerosis, which had the known but undisclosed side 
effects. See 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 37, § 9.5(A), at 558.  
 230. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 231. 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
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A.  Factual and Procedural History 
Williams began smoking Philip Morris cigarettes in the 1950s and 
continued until his death in 1997.
232
 Williams died of lung cancer, which a 
jury found was primarily caused by his years of smoking.
233
 Despite his 
family‘s efforts to the contrary, Williams continued to smoke the 
defendant‘s cigarettes because ―he had heard on television that cigarettes 
do not cause cancer.‖234 Williams responded to his family‘s pleas for him 
to stop ―by finding published assertions showing that cigarette smoking is 
not dangerous.‖235 Upon learning he had cancer, Williams said, ―those darn 
cigarette people finally did it. They were lying all the time.‖236 
Despite a Surgeon General‘s report in 1964 that highlighted the 
connection between smoking and lung cancer, Philip Morris continued to 
―encourage the impression that there was a genuine and continuing 
controversy‖ that the dangers of smoking were not clear.237 Williams 
asserted that this type of publicity was fraudulent because Philip Morris 
―knew that there was no legitimate controversy about the health effects of 
smoking and that defendant itself had no doubt that cigarette smoking 
carried serious health risks, including the risk of lung cancer.‖238 
After a full trial, the jury found in favor of Williams on both negligence 
and fraud grounds,
239
 awarding $21,485.80 in economic damages and 
$800,000 for each claim in non-economic damages.
240
 With respect to the 
negligence claim, the jury found Williams to be 50% at fault, and no 
punitive damages were awarded for this claim.
241
 As for the fraud claim, 
the jury awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages.
242
 The trial court 
                                                                                                                     
 232. Id. at 829. 
 233. Id. at 829 n.4. 
 234. Id. Williams‘ wife and children repeatedly told him that cigarettes were bad for his health, 
and his son attempted to give him articles that highlighted the dangers of smoking. Id. 
 235. Id. Williams ―insisted that the cigarette companies would not sell cigarettes if they were 
as dangerous as his family claimed.‖ Id. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. at 833. ―In an internal memorandum shortly after the 1964 report, a Philip Morris vice 
president explained that it was necessary to ‗provide some answers which will give smokers a 
psychological crutch and a self-rationale to continue smoking.‘‖ Id. Furthermore, in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, a director of research for Philip Morris said it was his job to ―fuel the controversy‖ as to 
whether cigarettes were harmful. Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. Id. at 831. Although Philip Morris and other tobacco companies conducted research on 
tobacco, they purposefully avoided such research in the United States where they would have had to 
document the results of the biological effects of tobacco use, instead opting to conduct their 
research in Europe where results could be destroyed. Id. at 834, 839. This research was designed to 
carefully avoid answering the question of whether cigarettes are harmful. Id. at 834. In the 1990s, 
the tobacco industry was ―forced to agree‖ that tobacco may be a ―risk factor‖ associated with 
numerous diseases. Id. Additionally, and despite evidence to the contrary, Philip Morris publicly 
professed a belief that cigarettes were not addictive. Id. 
 239. Id. at 828. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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reduced that amount to $32 million, finding the amount to be ―excessive 
under the United States Constitution.‖243 The trial court also reduced the 
non-economic damages to $500,000 pursuant to Oregon state law.
244
 
Both parties appealed.
245
 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court‘s remittitur, reinstating the original amount of punitive 
damages.
246
 It rejected Philip Morris‘ claims that (1) the trial court failed to 
instruct the jury not to punish Philip Morris for harm to nonparties and that 
the ―award should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to 
Williams‖; and (2) that the trial court‘s instruction that the maximum 
amount that the jury could award was $100 million was flawed.
247
 
In its decision to reinstate the $79.5 million punitive damages award, 
the Court of Appeals evaluated Oregon‘s statutory ―criteria for an award of 
punitive damages‖ to determine whether a punitive damages award of any 
size was justified under the facts of the case.
248
 In this regard, Oregon law 
established seven specific criteria for deciding in a products liability action 
whether the plaintiff has proven by ―clear and convincing evidence that the 
party against whom punitive damages are sought has acted with malice or 
has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable 
risk of harm and has acted with a conscious indifference to the health, 
safety and welfare of others.‖249 These seven criteria are:  
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise 
from the defendant‘s misconduct; (b) The degree of the 
defendant‘s awareness of that likelihood; (c) The profitability 
of the defendant‘s misconduct; (d) The duration of the 
misconduct and any concealment of it; (e) The attitude and 
conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct; 
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and (g) The total 
deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the 
defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not 
limited to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations 
similar to the claimant‘s and the severity of the criminal 
penalties to which the defendant has been or may be 
subjected.
250
 
The court briefly analyzed these seven factors, finding that each of 
them supported a punitive damages award. First, the court concluded that 
the jury could have found that it was very likely that Philip Morris‘ 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. The reduction of the non-economic damages was in accordance with OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18.560(1) (West 1987), which has since been renumbered as OR. REV. STAT. § 31.710 (West 
2011). See Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006). 
 245. Williams, 48 P.3d at 828. 
 246. Id. at 843. 
 247. Id. at 837–38. 
 248. Id. 
 249. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (West 2010). 
 250. Id. § 30.925(2). 
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―fraudulent statements‖ would be harmful.251 Second, the court determined 
that the jury could have found that Philip Morris was aware of the potential 
for harm by 1958 and was definitely aware of it by the 1970s.
252
 Third, the 
court concluded that Philip Morris‘ scheme was highly advantageous to its 
business because it was a lucrative industry, ultimately earning billions of 
dollars:
253
 ―There is evidence that defendant believed, in fact, that its 
misrepresentation of the dangers of smoking was important to its ability to 
continue in the cigarette business.‖254 Fourth, the court noted that Philip 
Morris‘ misconduct lasted more than forty years, and the defendant 
concealed it for as long as possible.
255
 Fifth, the court found no evidence 
that Philip Morris regretted its actions.
256
 Sixth, there was no dispute that 
Philip Morris is quite wealthy.
257
 And seventh, there was no evidence that 
Philip Morris had been previously punished for this misconduct.
258
 
Having satisfied itself that an award of punitive damages was 
appropriate, the court then proceeded to analyze whether the award was 
excessive under either state or federal law.
259
 After chronicling the 
evidence Williams introduced in support of the punitive damages claim,
260
 
the court readily found sufficient evidence under Oregon‘s own ―rational 
juror‖ standard to support the jury‘s original $79.5 million award.261 This 
evidence included, inter alia, the fact that Philip Morris knew that smoking 
was harmful while stating publicly that the issue was ―unresolved.‖262 
                                                                                                                     
 251. Williams, 48 P.3d at 839. 
 252. Id. at 840. 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Curiously, the court actually performed much of the state law excessiveness analysis 
before first determining whether the punitive damages award itself was legitimate. See id. at 838–
39. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 836–38 (citing Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473, 477 (Or. 2001)). The 
Oregon Supreme Court decided Parrott after the jury in Williams had reached its decision; 
therefore, the trial court did not have the benefit of the Court‘s Parrott analysis to consider in its 
determination to issue a remittitur. Id. at 836 n.16. The Parrott criteria are:  
 
―(1) the statutory and common-law factors that allow an award of punitive damages 
for the specific kind of claim at issue * * *; (2) the state interests that a punitive 
damages award is designed to serve * * *; (3) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant‘s conduct * * *; (4) the disparity between the punitive damages award 
and the actual or potential harm inflicted * * *; and (5) the civil and criminal 
sanctions provided for comparable misconduct[.]‖ 
Id. at 836 (alteration in original) (quoting Parrot, 17 P.3d at 484) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 262. Id. at 838. Additional evidence presented by the plaintiff included: the defendant knew 
nicotine was addictive; the defendant created ―controversy‖ to give highly addicted smokers a 
reason to justify their habit; the defendant conducted research without looking into the relationship 
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Next, the court of appeals considered the Oregon Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc.,
263
 as well as the Gore 
guideposts.
264
 In light of all of the evidence, the court concluded that a 
punitive damages award of $79.5 million was not unconstitutionally 
excessive and therefore should not have been reduced by the trial court.
265
 
On reconsideration, the court of appeals adhered to its opinion.
266
 
Philip Morris then sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court, which 
the court denied.
267
 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
vacated, and remanded the case ―in light of State Farm Mut. Automobile 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell.‖268 
On remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals reexamined the case in light 
of State Farm but ultimately concluded that it had been correct when it 
reinstated the jury‘s original $79.5 million punitive damages award.269 
Again, the court rejected Philip Morris‘ argument that the jury should have 
been instructed not to punish Philip Morris for the harm its misconduct 
may have caused others.
270
 In light of the Supreme Court‘s State Farm 
analysis, the court of appeals declared that Philip Morris‘ conduct was 
highly reprehensible
271
 and that the facts justified an award exceeding a 
single-digit ratio under the Due Process Clause.
272
 The court also noted 
that Philip Morris‘ great wealth273 could be considered by the jury when 
determining the amount of the punitive damages award.
274
 The court 
ultimately concluded that ―an award of punitive damages in the amount of 
$79.5 million does not violate the Due Process Clause under the guidelines 
provided by State Farm because the amount of the award is reasonable and 
proportionate to the wrong inflicted on decedent and the [citizens]‖ of the 
state of Oregon.
275
 
                                                                                                                     
between smoking and disease, and if results were unfavorable they were destroyed; ―defendant‘s 
actions caused harm to many others in Oregon besides Williams‖; and cigarettes are fairly 
inexpensive to manufacture and therefore there is a high profit margin. Id. at 838–39. 
 263. Id. at 840. In Parrott, the Court affirmed a verdict with a ratio of 87:1 for punitive and 
compensatory damages because the defendant‘s acts were ―particularly egregious.‖ Id. at 841. 
 264. Id. at 840–42. 
 265. Id. at 841–42. 
 266. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 1182. 
 270. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 142 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). The court adhered 
to its previous conclusion that, ―[T]he potential injury to past, present, and future consumers as the 
result of a routine business practice is an appropriate consideration in determining the amount of 
punitive damages.‖ Id. (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 837 (Or. Ct. App. 
2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 271. Id. The court noted the ―defendant used fraudulent means to continue a highly profitable 
business knowing that, as a result, it would cause death and injury to large numbers of Oregonians.‖ 
Id. at 143. 
 272. Id. at 145. 
 273. Id. The defendant‘s net worth was over $17 billion at the time. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 145–46. 
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The Oregon Supreme Court then agreed to review the case, but limited 
its review to two issues: whether the trial court‘s denial of Philip Morris‘ 
requested jury instruction was appropriate, and whether the $79.5 million 
punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
276
 
With respect to the jury instruction,
277
 the court agreed with the trial 
court and court of appeals that the requested instruction ―was incorrect 
under state law.‖278 Moreover, the court rejected Philip Morris‘ contention 
that its proffered jury instruction was mandated by the holding in State 
Farm, declaring instead that the instruction was actually inconsistent with 
the reasoning in State Farm.
279
 
With respect to whether the award was ―grossly excessive,‖ the court 
applied the Gore guideposts, ultimately concluding that the award was not 
―grossly excessive.‖280 When considering the reprehensibility of Philip 
Morris‘ conduct,281 the court determined that when the facts were 
construed in favor of Williams, Philip Morris‘ conduct was 
―extraordinarily reprehensible‖ and thus supported a ―very significant‖ 
punitive damages award.
282
 
                                                                                                                     
 276. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171–72 (Or. 2006). Philip Morris framed 
the issues as follows:  
A. Is a defendant entitled to have the jury instructed that any award of punitive 
damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the harm caused to the plaintiff 
and that punitive damages cannot be imposed for alleged harm to non-parties?  
B. Are the punitive damages assessed in this case unconstitutionally excessive 
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution? 
Id. at 1171. The Oregon Supreme Court denied review on two other questions relating to (1) 
detrimental reliance, and (2) federal preemption under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act. Id. at 1171–72. 
 277. See infra note 300 for the full text of the critical part of Philip Morris‘ proposed 
instruction. 
 278. Williams, 127 P.3d at 1175. 
 279. Id. at 1176. 
 280. Id. at 1176–82. 
 281. Id. at 1177. The court considered whether: 
―[T]he harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct 
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; 
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated 
actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional 
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.‖ 
Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)). 
 282. Id. at 1177–78. The court found the behavior reprehensible because of the ―fraudulent 
scheme‖ maintained by the defendant to ―deliberately . . . keep smokers smoking‖ while providing 
them with ―false or misleading information‖ that the harmful effects of cigarettes were still 
unknown. Id. at 1177. 
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As to the ratio between the punitive and compensatory damage awards, 
the court found that this guidepost, even when considering the potential 
compensatory damages that Williams would have had if he had survived 
longer, was ―not met.‖283 Finally, the court found that the comparable civil 
or criminal sanctions
284
 ―support[ed] a very significant punitive damage 
award.‖285 Thus, the Court concluded that ―[u]nder such extreme and 
outrageous circumstances‖ the jury‘s $79.5 million punitive damages 
award was consistent with due process.
286
 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the 
following issues as presented by Philip Morris: (1) its ―claim that Oregon 
had unconstitutionally permitted it to be punished for harming nonparty 
victims; and (2) whether Oregon had in effect disregarded ‗the 
constitutional requirement that punitive damages be reasonably related to 
the plaintiff‘s harm.‘‖287 
B.  Before the United States Supreme Court 
Those who carefully follow the Supreme Court‘s punitive damages 
jurisprudence would have expected Philip Morris to provide the Court 
with a vehicle to clarify some of the uncertainty and ambiguity lingering in 
the wake of State Farm.
288
 Court watchers were also anxious to see where 
newly appointed Justices Roberts and Alito would come out on punitive 
damages—would they join conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas in 
refusing to engage in this type of substantive due process analysis, or 
would they instead side with the more moderate (and pragmatically) 
conservative Justice Kennedy?
289
 Paradoxically, the answer turned out to 
                                                                                                                     
 283. Id. at 1181 (―All arguable versions of the ratios substantially exceed the single-digit ratio 
(9:1) that the Court has said ordinarily will apply in the usual case.‖). 
 284. Id. at 1178–80. Here, the court considered only comparable criminal sanctions because no 
comparable civil sanctions were cited by the parties or discovered through the court‘s own research. 
Id. at 1179. However, the court expressly stated that it ―must exercise care‖ when relying on 
criminal sanctions because of the United States Supreme Court‘s instructions in State Farm. Id. at 
1179 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428). 
 285. Id. at 1179–80. 
 286. Id. at 1182. 
 287. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007). 
 288. See Carol J. Gatewood, Philip Morris Case Gives Justices a Chance to Exorcise 
„Phantom‟ Plaintiffs, LAW.COM (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp? 
id=900005466263 (―The U.S. Supreme Court is presented today with the opportunity to untangle 
the web of confusion concerning punitive damages.‖); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Will Hear Case 
on High Punitive Damages, LAW.COM (May 31, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticle 
Friendly.jsp?id=900005549397 (―[L]ower state and federal courts have varied widely in their 
interpretations of the State Farm decision . . . .‖); Anthony J. Sebok, The Upcoming Supreme Court 
Argument Involving Punitive Damages Awards and Big Tobacco: Can These Awards Be Based on 
Injury to Persons Other than the Plaintiff? Part Two in a Two Part Series, FINDLAW (Oct. 24, 
2006), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/ sebok/20061024.html (stating as one of the issues left unresolved 
by Gore and State Farm, ―Can punitive damages be used to punish a defendant for conduct that 
harms anyone other than the plaintiff (or plaintiffs, if there is more than one)?‖). 
 289. See Joan Biskupic, $79.5M in Punitive Damages at Core of Supreme Court Case, USA 
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be pretty much ―yes‖ to both questions—in joining Justice Breyer‘s 
majority opinion (along with Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter) that 
purported to resolve the case on procedural due process grounds,
290
 
Justices Roberts and Alito were able to sidestep the substantive due 
process issue completely.
291
 
From all outward appearances, Philip Morris did not appear to be much 
more than a stripped-down version of State Farm—a deep-pocketed 
member of an unpopular industry seeking to overturn a very large punitive 
damages award that followed a trial that exposed its misdeeds. Indeed, 
many of the problems with the evidence in State Farm that could otherwise 
distract from the core substantive due process issue, i.e., whether the 
punitive damages award was ―grossly excessive,‖ were not present in 
Philip Morris. For example, the trial court in Philip Morris did not admit 
evidence of individuals in other states who were harmed by the defendant, 
as had been done in State Farm.
292
 Moreover, the evidence admitted at trial 
in Philip Morris did not concern other acts, whether similar or dissimilar, 
committed by Philip Morris, as had been the case in State Farm.
293
 
Accordingly, conventional wisdom suggested that the Supreme Court‘s 
opinion would focus on the Gore guideposts, with particular attention paid 
to the nearly 100:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages.
294
 
                                                                                                                     
TODAY, Oct. 27, 2006, at 4A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/ 
judicial/2006-10-26-damages_x.htm (quoting Mark Levy, a lawyer who closely monitors punitive 
damages jurisprudence: ―‗The court is on the knife edge,‘ Levy says. If Roberts and Alito join the 
justices who dissented in the State Farm case and want to leave the matter to the states, Levy says, 
there would be ‗a sudden and radical change in this area of the law.‘‖); Greg Stohr, Roberts, Alito 
Will Decide Punitive Damages Caps at High Court, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2006), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=a11NoJr8Oq2w&refer=politics (stating 
that Roberts and Alito are the ―wild cards in the case‖ and must decide whether to side with the 
conservatives, Scalia and Thomas, or the more centrist Justices: Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and 
Stevens). 
 290. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353. In dissent, Justice Thomas rejected the Court‘s 
characterization of the case as resting on procedural due process grounds: ―It matters not that the 
Court styles today‘s holding as ‗procedural‘ because the ‗procedural‘ rule is simply a confusing 
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has created for punitive damages.‖ 
Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 291. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $79.5 Million in Punitive Damages Against 
Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at A14 (explaining that the Court decided the case on 
procedural rather than substantive grounds and wondering if the reason might be that Roberts and 
Alito are unwilling to recognize substantive due process in punitive damages cases).  
 292. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420–21 (2003) (stating that 
the trial court was convinced that there was no limit to the geographic scope of evidence that could 
be admitted under Court precedent); Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 350 (explaining that the plaintiff‘s 
attorney in Philip Morris had asked the jury to ―think about how many other Jesse Williams in the 
last 40 years in the State of Oregon there have been‖) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 293. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 420–21. 
 294. See Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October Term 2006, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
361, 370 (―As it comes to the Supreme Court, Williams presents two basic issues: (1) the 
relationship between the various Gore guideposts and (2) whether the Constitution permits a jury to 
consider non-party conduct as it awards punitive damages.‖); Supreme Court to Hear Philip Morris 
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But lurking just beneath the surface was the real issue driving this case—
the multiple punishments problem. As noted above,
295
 while Justice 
Kennedy‘s majority opinion in State Farm purported to rely on principles 
of federalism in deciding that a jury is not permitted to punish a defendant 
for lawful, out-of-state conduct,
296
 he also characterized the potential for 
multiple punishments as ―a more fundamental reason‖ for disallowing the 
other acts evidence.
297
 
1.  The Briefs 
a.  Petition for Certiorari 
Philip Morris sought review in the United States Supreme Court on the 
basis of three questions presented: 
1. Whether, in reviewing a jury‘s award of punitive 
damages, an appellate court‘s conclusion that a defendant‘s 
conduct was highly reprehensible and analogous to a crime 
can ―override‖ the constitutional requirement that punitive 
damages be reasonably related to the plaintiff‘s harm. 
2. Whether due process permits a jury to punish a defendant 
for the effects of its conduct on non-parties. 
3. Whether, in reviewing a punitive award for 
excessiveness, an appellate court is permitted to give the 
plaintiff the benefit of all conceivable inferences that might 
support a finding of high reprehensibility even if the jury 
made no such specific factual findings.
298
 
In urging the Court to grant review on the first question presented, 
Philip Morris chronicled what it argued were numerous splits and conflicts 
among lower courts relating to the application of the second Gore 
guidepost—the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.299 
With respect to the second question presented, Philip Morris contended 
that the Oregon Supreme Court‘s approval of the trial court‘s refusal to 
                                                                                                                     
Appeal, CNNMONEY.COM (May 30, 2006) http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/30/news/companies/ 
scotus_philipmorris/index.htm (―The high court set no . . . precise ratio between punitive and actual 
damages for determining what would be ‗excessive‘ in violation of the Constitution‘s [D]ue 
[P]rocess [C]lause. But exceptions could be made, said [Justice] Kennedy, ‗if a particularly 
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.‘ That legal standard will 
now be tested in this latest appeal.‖). 
 295. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 296. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422. 
 297. Id. at 422–23. 
 298. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 
(2007) (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 849860, at *I. 
 299. See id. at 8–14. 
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read an instruction informing the jury that it could not ―punish the 
defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons‖300 was 
both contrary to State Farm and created a conflict among the lower 
courts.
301
 The problem with allowing a jury to punish a defendant for harm 
caused to other persons was, of course, the multiple punishments problem: 
―It is a recipe for multiple punishments for the same harms,‖302 that 
―creates a grave risk of excessive, multiple punishment.‖303 
The third question presented by Philip Morris concerned whether 
courts reviewing punitive damages for excessiveness should automatically 
draw all inferences in favor of upholding the verdict, as the Oregon 
Supreme Court had done.
304
 While Philip Morris conceded that this 
approach was perfectly appropriate in addressing the sufficiency of the 
evidence questions,
305
 it argued that such an approach was not acceptable 
in addressing excessiveness questions under the guidance of Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
306
 which mandated a de 
novo excessiveness review.
307
 The deferential approach adopted and 
applied by the Oregon Supreme Court, argued Philip Morris, directly 
contradicted the approach of the California Supreme Court
308
 and other 
federal courts.
309
 
                                                                                                                     
 300. Id. at 14. The full text of this part of Philip Morris‘ proposed jury instruction reads as 
follows:  
The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm 
caused to Jesse Williams by the defendant‘s punishable conduct. Although you 
may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that 
reasonable relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its 
alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in 
which other juries can resolve their claims and award punitive damages for those 
harms, as those other juries see fit. 
Id. at 14–15. 
 301. Specifically, Philip Morris contended that both the California Supreme Court and the 
Eighth Circuit had correctly applied State Farm, concluding that while harm to others could be 
considered in the context of the reprehensibility Gore factor, the jury was not permitted to punish 
the defendant for this harm. Id. at 19 (citing Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82, 93 (Cal. 
2005) (allowing jury to consider ―[t]he scale and profitability of a course of wrongful conduct‖ in 
evaluating reprehensibility but prohibiting jury from punishing the defendant for harm to anyone 
other than the plaintiff); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(―Punishing systematic abuses by a punitive damages award in a case brought by an individual 
plaintiff . . . deprives the defendant of the safeguards against duplicative punishment that inhere in 
the class action procedure.‖).  
 302. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 298, at 15. 
 303. Id. at 21. 
 304. Id. at 24. 
 305. See id. 
 306. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 307. See id. at 436–37. 
 308. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 298, at 24 (citing Simon v. San Paolo 
U.S. Holding Co., 113 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2005)). 
 309. See id. at 25. 
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In opposition, Williams characterized the questions presented by Philip 
Morris quite differently: 
1. Whether the ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages comprises the conclusive and overriding guidepost 
as to the reasonableness of a punitive damages verdict. 
2. Whether due process forbids a state from punishing a 
defendant for its egregious and profitable misconduct on the 
basis of the actual and potential effects of that misconduct 
throughout the state. 
3. Whether state law that requires appellate courts to review 
facts in the light most favorable to the party for whom the jury 
ruled violates due process of law.
310
 
Williams devoted a majority of her opposition brief to the first 
question, arguing that the Oregon Supreme Court ―faithfully‖ applied State 
Farm, even though the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages far 
exceeded the single-digit standard suggested by State Farm.
311
 With 
respect to the second question, Williams contended that Philip Morris‘ 
proffered jury instruction was not mandated by State Farm, was contrary to 
Oregon law, and was internally self-contradictory.
312
 Finally, with respect 
to the third question, Williams argued that the Oregon Supreme Court‘s 
deferential review was consistent with Supreme Court precedent and that 
this argument had been waived by Philip Morris.
313
 
The Supreme Court granted Philip Morris‘ petition but limited its 
review to the first two questions presented.
314
 
b.  Briefs on the Merits 
In its opening brief, Philip Morris recharacterized and reordered its 
questions presented, choosing to lead with the question that directly raised 
the multiple punishments problem: 
1. Whether the Oregon courts deprived Philip Morris of due 
process by permitting the jury to punish Philip Morris for 
harms to non-parties. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 310. Brief in Opposition at i, Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 1151025, 
at *i.  
 311. Id. at 10–22. 
 312. Id. at 22–26. 
 313. Id. at 27–29. 
 314. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352. 
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2. Whether, in considering a claim that a punitive award is 
unconstitutionally excessive, a court may disregard the 
constitutional requirement that punitive damages be 
reasonably related to the plaintiff‘s harm whenever it 
concludes that (i) the jury could have found the defendant‘s 
conduct to be highly reprehensible and (ii) the conduct could 
come within the statutory definition of a crime.
315
 
From the very beginning of its discussion of the first question 
presented, Philip Morris attempted to focus the Court‘s attention on the 
multiple punishments problem.
316
 Indeed, throughout its discussion of the 
first question, Philip Morris repeatedly raised the specter of multiple 
punishments for the same act or course of conduct, contending that the 
Oregon Supreme Court‘s decision would allow juries to punish defendants 
for harm to those not before the court.
317
 This multiple punishment, argued 
Philip Morris, is ―plainly unconstitutional‖ in violation of due process.318 
This is true, complained Philip Morris, because such punishment deprives 
a defendant of property with no assurance that it will not be punished again 
for the same conduct.
319
 
With respect to the second question, Philip Morris argued that Supreme 
Court precedent made clear that courts reviewing punitive damages awards 
for excessiveness must pay careful attention to all three Gore guideposts.
320
 
In light of the Oregon Supreme Court‘s admission that the second Gore 
factor—the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages—was not 
met, Philip Morris contended that the punitive damages award against it 
violated due process and could not stand.
321
 Philip Morris then asserted 
that when all three Gore factors were properly considered, a ratio no higher 
than ―4:1‖ would be permissible.322 
                                                                                                                     
 315. Brief for the Petitioner at I, Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 
2190746, at *I. 
 316. Id. at 10 (―This Court has squarely held that ‗[d]ue process does not permit courts, in the 
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties‘ hypothetical claims 
against a defendant.‘ That is because ‗[p]unishment on these bases creates the possibility of 
multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct . . . .‘‖ (citation omitted) (quoting State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003))). 
 317. Id. at 11 (―Oregon has embraced a procedure that affirmatively promotes excessive, 
duplicative punishment: a defendant may be punished multiple times for the harms that it allegedly 
imposed on hundreds or thousands of State residents, without regard to whether it could 
successfully defend against the claims of some or most of those residents.‖); id. (―Therefore, other 
Oregonians remain free to sue Philip Morris for smoking-related injuries, and to seek punitive 
damages for their injuries, even though the punitive award in this case may already punish for those 
harms. Insofar as any of those plaintiffs succeed, Philip Morris will be punished repeatedly for 
causing exactly the same injuries to exactly the same people.‖). 
 318. Id. at 12. 
 319. Id. (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961)). 
 320. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 315, at 27–28. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 44. 
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In opposition, Williams acceded to the change in the order of the 
questions presented in Philip Morris‘ opening brief, and modified her 
version of the questions presented from those articulated in her opposition 
to certiorari:
323
 
1. Whether due process allows a state to impose punitive 
damages based on the actual and potential effects of the 
defendant‘s wrongful conduct throughout the state?[324] 
2. Whether the ratio between compensatory and punitive 
damages comprises the conclusive and overriding guidepost 
as to the reasonableness of a punitive damages verdict?
325
 
Williams did not, however, change the order of the arguments in her 
brief, opting to lead with her argument that the level of reprehensibility of 
Philip Morris‘ conduct justified the very large punitive damages award.326 
Turning to the question of whether it was proper for Philip Morris to be 
punished for causing harm to individuals other than the plaintiff, Williams 
argued that because punitive damages are designed to punish the 
defendant‘s conduct (rather than to compensate for plaintiff‘s harm), it was 
entirely proper for the jury to consider harm caused to others by the 
conduct in question when determining the appropriate size of a punitive 
damages award.
327
 The Supreme Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence, 
contended Williams, was not to the contrary.
328
 Williams addressed the 
multiple punishments problem head on, declaring that it was ―little more 
than a hypothetical possibility‖ under Oregon law and not an issue in this 
case.
329
 This is true, contended Williams, because this case was the first 
and only verdict in Oregon imposing punitive damages against Philip 
Morris and because Oregon‘s statutory scheme required juries and 
reviewing courts to take into account prior punitive damages awards for the 
same misconduct.
330
 Finally, Williams contended that the jury instruction 
proffered by Philip Morris was properly rejected by the trial court because, 
as phrased, it was not correct under Oregon state law.
331
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 323. Brief for Respondent at i, Philip Morris, 549 U.S. 346 (No. 05-1256), 2006 WL 2668158, 
at *i.  
 324. Id. The wording of this question presented differs slightly from that used in Williams‘ 
opposition to certiorari. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 325. Id. The wording of this question presented is identical to that used in Williams‘ 
opposition to certiorari. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 326. Brief for Respondent, supra note 323, at 4–20 (discussing the reprehensibility factor as it 
applies to Philip Morris). 
 327. Id. at 35–44. 
 328. Id. at 37–38, 42–44. 
 329. Id. at 45. 
 330. Id. at 45–46. 
 331. Id. at 46–49. 
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2.  The Majority Opinion 
Those who hoped the Court would provide additional clarification on 
the ratio guidepost were sorely disappointed—the Court declined to reach 
the Gore factors at all.
332
 Those who hoped the Court would repudiate (or 
at least abandon) substantive due process in the punitive damages context 
were also left empty-handed. Writing for a bare five-member majority, 
Justice Breyer reversed the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court and 
vacated the $79.5 million verdict.
333
 From the very beginning of the 
opinion, Justice Breyer made clear that the Court‘s eye was on the multiple 
punishments problem rather than on the Gore factors: ―The question we 
address today concerns . . . whether the Constitution‘s Due Process Clause 
permits a jury to base [a punitive damages] award in part upon its desire to 
punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before the court.‖334 
The ―persons who are not before the court‖ are, of course, others who have 
been harmed by the defendant‘s same conduct who could later bring their 
own claims for punitive (and compensatory) damages. As discussed below, 
this opening statement in the opinion foreshadows later pronouncements 
that make clear that the lurking and unresolved multiple punishments 
problem heavily influences the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence.335 
After summarizing the material facts and the procedural history of the 
case, Justice Breyer briefly traced the evolution of the Supreme Court‘s 
incursion into punitive damages.
336
 In doing so, Justice Breyer drew a 
careful distinction between substantive due process analysis and procedural 
due process analysis: questions relating to whether a punitive damages 
award is ―grossly excessive‖ are substantive due process questions while 
(seemingly) all other questions are procedural due process questions.
337
 
Since the Court resolved the case without deciding whether the punitive 
damages award was ―grossly excessive,‖ reasoned Justice Breyer, then ipso 
facto this was a procedural (and not substantive) due process case.
338
 
Justice Breyer then declared that procedural due process ―forbids a 
State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that 
it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury 
that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the 
litigation.‖339 Justice Breyer went on to explain that this was true for at 
least two reasons. First, punishing a defendant for harm to a nonparty 
would deprive the defendant of an opportunity to present all available 
                                                                                                                     
 332. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007). 
 333. Id. Joining Justice Breyer were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and 
Alito. Id. at 348. 
 334. Id. at 349. 
 335. See infra notes 339–42 and accompanying text. 
 336. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352–53. 
 337. Id. at 353. 
 338. Id. Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas was less than convinced by what he perceived to be a 
judicial sleight of hand: ―It matters not that the Court styles today‘s holding as ‗procedural‘ because 
the ‗procedural‘ rule is simply a confusing implementation of the substantive due process regime 
this Court has created for punitive damages.‖ Id. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 339. Id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
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defenses.
340
 Second, punishing a defendant for harm to a nonparty ―would 
add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation,‖ 
leaving open such questions as the number of victims and the 
circumstances and seriousness of their injuries.
341
 But the more important, 
yet here not explicitly stated, reason is what this author believes to be the 
driving force behind the Court‘s prohibition of punishing the defendant for 
harm to nonparties—the multiple punishments problem. As Justice 
Kennedy (joined by, inter alia, Justice Breyer) noted in State Farm, 
punishing a defendant for harm caused to nonparties ―creates the 
possibility of multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct.‖342 
Just why Justice Breyer chose not to mention explicitly the multiple 
punishments problem here is discussed later in this Article.
343
 
Justice Breyer then clarified language from earlier opinions that had 
suggested that punishing a defendant for harm to others was permissible. 
First, he explained that while the Court had previously stated that it would 
be permissible to consider ―the potential harm defendant‘s conduct could 
have caused‖ when assessing punitive damages, only the potential harm to 
the plaintiff was appropriately considered.
344
 Second, Justice Breyer 
corrected a misimpression left by the Court‘s suggestion in Gore that the 
Alabama Supreme Court‘s punitive damages calculation that likely 
included a consideration of harm to nonparties was ―error-free.‖345 
Justice Breyer then turned to the difficult task of distinguishing 
between the proper use of evidence of harm to nonparties and the improper 
and unconstitutional use of such evidence. Williams argued, and Philip 
Morris conceded, that harm to nonparties caused by the conduct that 
harmed the plaintiff was admissible and highly relevant to show the extent 
of the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct.346 Justice Breyer readily 
agreed: ―Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the 
conduct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to 
the general public, and so was particularly reprehensible . . . .‖347And while 
it may consider such evidence when evaluating a defendant‘s 
reprehensibility, ―a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive 
damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is 
alleged to have visited on nonparties.‖348 Accordingly, Justice Breyer 
declared that procedural due process requires that juries be properly 
instructed on the permissible uses of evidence of harm to nonparties.
349
 
                                                                                                                     
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 354. 
 342. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (citing BMW of 
N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 343. See infra Part IV. 
 344. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 355. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. (―We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States to provide 
assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not simply to determine 
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Turning to the facts of the instant case, Justice Breyer agreed with 
Philip Morris that the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the jury‘s punitive 
damages award pursuant to a mistaken premise that it was permissible for 
the jury to punish Philip Morris for the harm it caused to nonparties.
350
 The 
Oregon Supreme Court, Justice Breyer determined, had failed to grasp the 
difference between allowing a jury to consider harm to others when 
evaluating reprehensibility on the one hand and actually punishing Philip 
Morris for such harm on the other hand.
351
 That the Oregon Supreme Court 
failed to appreciate this distinction was betrayed by its declaration that ―[i]f 
a jury cannot punish for the conduct, then it is difficult to see why it may 
consider it at all.‖352 As Justice Kennedy had done in State Farm,353 Justice 
Breyer analogized to recidivism statutes that permit taking into account a 
criminal defendant‘s other misconduct in determining the appropriate 
punishment for the offense before the court.
354
 
In an attempt to provide practical guidance to lower courts called upon 
to apply this case, Justice Breyer explained that courts must take care not 
to ―authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk 
of any such confusion occurring.‖355 Consequently, when there is a 
significant risk that the jury will misunderstand the distinction between 
using evidence of harm to nonparties in evaluating the defendant‘s level of 
reprehensibility and directly punishing the defendant for such harm, a court 
must put in place procedures (presumably jury instructions) that protect 
against such a risk, if requested by the defendant to do so.
356
 While 
constitutionally mandated to take some precautions, states are afforded 
some flexibility in determining what those precautions will look like.
357
 
Concluding that the Oregon Supreme Court misunderstood and 
misapplied the constitutional standard, the Court remanded the case to the 
Oregon Supreme Court to apply the correct standard.
358
 In reliance upon 
the fact that the Oregon Supreme Court might order a new trial or reduce 
the size of the punitive damages on remand, the Court declined to reach the 
question of whether the punitive damages award assessed by the jury 
violated substantive due process as ―grossly excessive.‖359 
 
                                                                                                                     
reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused to strangers.‖). 
 350. Id. at 356–57. 
 351. Id. at 357. 
 352. Id. at 356 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 
1175 n.3 (Or. 2006)). 
 353. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003). 
 354. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995)). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. (―Although the States have some flexibility to determine what kind of procedures they 
will implement, federal constitutional law obligates them to provide some form of protection in 
appropriate cases.‖). 
 358. Id. at 357–58. 
 359. Id. 
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3.  The Dissents 
The four Justices in dissent authored three opinions. Justices Stevens 
and Thomas both dissented individually while Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent 
was joined by both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. 
Having authored the majority opinion in Gore, and having joined 
Justice Kennedy‘s majority opinion in State Farm, Justice Stevens found 
himself in unfamiliar territory as a dissenter, at least with respect to 
punitive damages. Unlike Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, the 
source of Justice Stevens‘s disagreement with the majority in Philip Morris 
was not based on whether due process imposed substantive limits on 
punitive damages awards or whether the Court was improvidently 
intruding into territory reserved to the states. To the contrary, Justice 
Stevens fully embraced the Court‘s prior punitive damages decisions.360 
While agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that the Oregon courts committed no 
procedural errors, Justice Stevens was much more troubled by the 
majority‘s prohibition of punishing a defendant for causing harm to 
nonparties.
361
 Justice Stevens‘s point of departure from the majority was in 
the fundamental assumption of what punitive damages are designed to do. 
While the majority viewed an award of punitive damages as vindication for 
harm caused to the individual plaintiff, Justice Stevens, analogizing to the 
justification for criminal sanctions, regarded the purpose of punitive 
damages as vindication of harm caused to the public: ―Whereas 
compensatory damages are measured by the harm the defendant caused the 
plaintiff, punitive damages are a sanction for the public harm the 
defendant‘s conduct has caused or threatened.‖362 Justice Stevens 
contended that the majority‘s approach marked a departure from precedent, 
complaining that ―[w]e have never held otherwise.‖363 
Justice Stevens then took issue with the distinction the majority drew 
between punishing a defendant for harm caused to nonparties on the one 
hand, and considering such harm when evaluating the defendant‘s level of 
reprehensibility on the other.
364
 Claiming that such a ―nuance‖ is a 
distinction without a difference, Justice Stevens declared that ―[w]hen a 
jury increases a punitive damages award because injuries to third parties 
enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant‘s conduct, the jury is by 
definition punishing the defendant—directly—for third-party harm.‖365 
Justice Stevens also discounted the majority‘s analogy to recidivism 
                                                                                                                     
 360. Id. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―I remain firmly convinced that the cases announcing 
those constraints were correctly decided.‖). 
 361. Id. (―Unlike the Court, I see no reason why an interest in punishing a wrongdoer ‗for 
harming persons who are not before the court‘ . . . should not be taken into consideration when 
assessing the appropriate sanction for reprehensible conduct.‖). 
 362. Id. at 358–59; see also id. at 359 (―[A] punitive damages award, instead of serving a 
compensatory purpose, serves the entirely different purposes of retribution and deterrence that 
underlie every criminal sanction.‖). 
 363. Id. at 359. Justice Stevens did allow, however, that awarding ―compensatory damages to 
remedy such third-party harm might well constitute a taking of property from the defendant without 
due process.‖ Id. 
 364. Id. at 360. 
 365. Id. 
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statutes, reasoning that if permitting past crimes that have already been 
punished to serve as the basis for enhancing the punishment for the present 
crime (as was allowed), then surely it was permissible to enhance the size 
of a punitive damages award assessed for conduct that had never 
previously been punished based upon the fact that such conduct injured 
multiple people.
366
 
Finally, Justice Stevens obliquely questioned the Court‘s 
characterization of the case as one involving procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, due process. While judicial restraint, cautioned Justice 
Stevens, counseled the Court to exercise extreme care when announcing 
new substantive due process rules, ―[t]oday the majority ignores that sound 
advice.‖367 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas saw little virtue in being oblique in his 
attack on the majority opinion: ―It matters not that the Court styles today‘s 
holding as ‗procedural‘ because the ‗procedural‘ rule is simply a confusing 
implementation of the substantive due process regime this Court has 
created for punitive damages.‖368 And in Justice Thomas‘s view, the 
substantive due process regime the Court has created for punitive damages 
lacks constitutional legitimacy.
369
 As a parting shot, Justice Thomas 
reiterated his prior characterization of the Court‘s punitive damages 
jurisprudence as ―insusceptible of principled application.‖370 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg did not directly engage the majority on 
its pronouncements regarding the contours of due process. Rather, she 
disputed the majority‘s application of its due process rules to the actions of 
the Oregon courts. 
It is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg accepted the majority‘s new due 
process rule to the effect that ―when punitive damages are at issue, a jury is 
properly instructed to consider the extent of harm suffered by others as a 
measure of reprehensibility, but not to mete out punishment for injuries in 
fact sustained by nonparties,‖371 or simply supposed it to be accurate for 
the purposes of argument. Convinced that ―[t]he Oregon courts did not rule 
otherwise,‖372 however, Justice Ginsburg chided the Court for not 
identifying any evidence or jury charge inconsistent with the due process 
rule announced by the majority.
373
 
                                                                                                                     
 366. Id. at 360 n.2. Importantly, Justice Stevens‘s rationale is based upon an assumption that 
the conduct that gave rise to the punitive damages had not previously been punished. It thus appears 
that if a punitive damages award had, in fact, already been imposed for the same conduct, then the 
later award might violate due process as an impermissible multiple punishment. 
 367. Id. at 361. 
 368. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 369. Id. (―‗[T]he Constitution does not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.‘‖ 
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429–30 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting))). 
 370. Id. at 361–62 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, 
J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 371. Id. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. In support of this contention, Justice Ginsburg quoted the Oregon Supreme Court to 
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The majority opinion, according to Justice Ginsburg, was ―all the more 
inexplicable‖ given that Philip Morris did not object to (1) the evidence 
introduced by Williams at trial, (2) the argument made by Williams‘ 
counsel, or (3) the actual instructions given to the jury.
374
 The only 
objection Philip Morris raised was to the trial court‘s refusal to read the 
jury instruction it offered—an instruction, contended Justice Ginsburg, 
correctly refused by the trial court because it would have served to confuse, 
rather than enlighten, the jury.
375
 Rather than addressing whether Philip 
Morris‘ proposed instruction was proper, the majority, lamented Justice 
Ginsburg, ―reaches outside the bounds of the case as postured when the 
trial court entered its judgment.‖376 According to Justice Ginsburg, the net 
result was that lower courts were now left to try to apply the Court‘s 
―changing, less than crystalline precedent.‖377 
C.  Oregon Supreme Court Opinion on Remand 
It appeared that Philip Morris had won a significant victory at the 
United States Supreme Court even though the Court had side-stepped the 
substantive due process ―gross excessiveness‖ discussion. The importance 
of a ruling that defendants could not be directly punished through punitive 
damages for harm caused to nonparties cannot be overstated; this was huge 
for Philip Morris in this case and for all other defendants in future cases.
378
 
One could not blame Philip Morris for having confidence that the directive 
to lower courts that they must use sufficient procedural safeguards to 
prevent this punishment would mean that the massive award against it 
would likely be reduced dramatically. This was not meant to be. 
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged that the mandate 
of the Supreme Court was ―to apply the constitutional standard set by the 
Supreme Court in our consideration of . . . whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to give [Philip Morris‘] proposed jury instruction.‖379 But, before 
it did so, the Oregon Supreme Court declared that it would first have to 
consider ―a preliminary, independent state law standard.‖380 That 
independent state law standard was ―a well-understood‖ Oregon rule to the 
                                                                                                                     
the effect that ―[t]he jury, in assessing the reprehensibility of Philip Morris‟s actions, could 
consider evidence of similar harm to other Oregonians caused (or threatened) by the same conduct.‖ 
Id. (quoting Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1177 (Or. 2006)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 374. Id. at 362–63. 
 375. Id. at 363. 
 376. Id. at 364. 
 377. Id. 
 378. See Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Limits Punitive Damages, Backs Altria (Update 6), 
BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a.XIF 
WwNpXJs (‗―This is a big win for the business community,‘ said Robin Conrad, senior vice 
president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce‘s litigation unit in Washington. ‗Today‘s decision 
correctly addresses business‘s concern that punishing defendants for harm to those not involved in 
the lawsuit denies a company the right to defend claims against it.‘‖). 
 379. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260 (Or. 2008). 
 380. Id. 
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effect that ―[a]n appellate court will not reverse a trial court‘s refusal to 
give a proposed jury instruction, unless the proposed instruction was ‗clear 
and correct in all respects, both in form and in substance.‘‖381 The court 
then readily concluded that Philip Morris‘ proposed jury instruction was 
incorrect in two ways. First, the proposed instruction used ―may‖ rather 
than the statutorily prescribed ―shall‖ in relation to the jury‘s consideration 
of Oregon‘s punitive damages factors.382 Second, the proposed 
instruction‘s paraphrasing of one of the factors, concluded the court, 
rendered it inaccurate under Oregon law, injecting an ―intent‖ element 
where none existed.
383
 Accordingly, the Oregon Supreme Court declared 
that although the trial court erred in rejecting Philip Morris‘ proposed 
instruction on the grounds upon which the court relied, there were 
additional, independent reasons grounded in Oregon law that rendered the 
rejection of the instruction entirely appropriate.
384
 As a consequence, the 
court reinstated the $79.5 million punitive damages award against Philip 
Morris.
385
 
D.  Certiorari Dismissed as “Improvidently Granted” 
Unsurprisingly, Philip Morris once again sought review in the United 
States Supreme Court, raising the following two questions in its petition 
for certiorari: 
1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a 
party‘s federal claim and remanded the case to state court 
with instructions to ―apply‖ the correct constitutional 
standard, the state court may interpose—for the first time in 
the litigation—a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly 
established nor regularly followed.
  
2. Whether a punitive damages award that is 97 times the 
compensatory damages may be upheld on the ground that the 
reprehensibility of a defendant‘s conduct can ―override‖ the 
constitutional requirement that punitive damages be 
reasonably related to the plaintiffs harm.
386
 
Notably, the Court granted certiorari as to the first question only,
387
 
declining once again to address the substantive due process ―gross 
excessiveness‖ question. 
                                                                                                                     
 381. Id. at 1261 (quoting Beglau v. Albertus, 536 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Or. 1975)). 
 382. Id. at 1262–63. 
 383. Id. at 1263. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. at 1263–64. 
 386. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 553 U.S. 1093 (2008) 
(No. 07-1216), 2008 WL 795148, at *i. 
 387. Philip Morris, 553 U.S. at 1093. 
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At oral argument, counsel for Philip Morris stressed that the Oregon 
Supreme Court never applied the standard mandated by the United States 
Supreme Court, i.e., the need to prevent punitive damages from being 
based on harm to nonparties.
388
 In response, counsel for Williams argued 
that although the Oregon Supreme Court did not know prior to the Court‘s 
decision that including harm to nonparties in a punitive damages calculus 
violated the federal Constitution, it had to limit its review on remand to the 
proposed jury instruction because it was the only issue preserved by Philip 
Morris for appeal.
389
 And since the jury instruction was fatally flawed 
under Oregon law, the Oregon Supreme Court correctly determined that 
the award should stand.
390
 
This discussion prompted a pointed question from Justice Souter to 
counsel for Williams as to how the Court might prevent its constitutional 
decisions being avoided on remand ―by some clever device.‖391 In the 
ensuing dialogue, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that one way to 
vindicate the Court‘s authority in this case would be to address the second 
question raised by Philip Morris—the substantive due process question.392 
But after raising the specter of reaching this question, the Chief Justice 
made clear that he was not actually proposing a review of the substantive 
due process question.
393
 
Ultimately, after the oral arguments, the Court dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as having been improvidently granted, and the case was finally 
over.
394
 
E.  A Concurrent Grant of Certiorari: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 
Before analyzing the current state of punitive damages jurisprudence in 
the wake of Philip Morris, a brief discussion of Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker
395
 is necessary to fully set the stage. After the Oregon Supreme 
Court‘s opinion on remand, but before the oral argument discussed 
immediately above, another rather large punitive damages case, Exxon, was 
brought before the Court. This case arose out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
in Alaska and involved a punitive damages award of $2.5 billion.
396
 Since 
the spill took place in navigable waters, federal statutory and common law 
applied to the case.
397
 Exxon sought certiorari on numerous grounds, 
                                                                                                                     
 388. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Philip Morris, 553 U.S. 1093 (No. 07-1216), 2008 WL 
6524409, at *3. 
 389. Id. at 47. 
 390. Id. at 47–48. 
 391. Id. at 48. 
 392. Id. at 51. 
 393. Id. at 52. 
 394. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436, 1436 (2009).  
 395. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 396. Id. at 2611. 
 397. Id. at 2626–27 (stating that the Court‘s review of punitive damages in the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill involves ―regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this 
Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of statute‖). 
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including on the question of whether the $2.5 billion punitive damages 
award was within the limits allowed by substantive due process.
398
 
While the Court agreed to determine whether the punitive damages 
award was excessive under federal maritime common law, it declined to 
review whether the size of the award violated federal substantive due 
process.
399
 The Court was able to skirt the constitutional ―excessiveness‖ 
issue because it decided a nearly identical question under federal maritime 
law.
400
 Accordingly, this case is significant only to the extent it provides a 
window into the views of the Justices who had previously abstained from 
opining on the question of how big of a punitive damages award was too 
big. This group of abstainers included not only Justices Thomas, Scalia, 
and Ginsburg, who had previously steadfastly refused to engage in the 
―gross excessiveness‖ inquiry,401 but it also included Chief Justice Roberts, 
who had ducked this issue (with the rest of the majority in Philip Morris) 
the one time it was presented to him after joining the Court. (Notably, it 
did not include Justice Alito, even though he had avoided the ―gross 
excessiveness‖ question in Philip Morris, because he recused himself from 
this case on account of his ownership of Exxon stock.)
402
 
Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Exxon, which was 
unanimous as to Parts I, II, & III, but three Justices—Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Stevens—dissented from Parts IV & V, which considered the size of 
punitive damages under federal maritime law.
403
 In Parts IV & V, the Court 
concluded that a 1:1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages 
was an appropriate limit.
404
 The analytical road to this firm numerical limit 
began with the idea that a punitive damages award ―should be reasonably 
predictable in its severity‖ to properly accomplish the deterrence 
objective.
405
 Then, because a descriptive formulation of a standard was 
susceptible to divergent interpretations, the Court concluded that a 
quantified standard was preferable.
406
 After noting that placing numerical 
caps on punitive awards was not well-suited for judge-made law because of 
                                                                                                                     
 398. See id. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 2007 
WL 2383784, at *i. 
 399. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2614 (―We granted certiorari to consider whether maritime law 
allows corporate liability for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of managerial agents, 
whether the Clean Water Act forecloses the award of punitive damages in maritime spill cases, and 
whether the punitive damages awarded against Exxon in this case were excessive as a matter of 
maritime common law.‖ (internal citation omitted)). 
 400. Id. at 2626–27. 
 401. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. 
 402. See Greg Stohr, Pfizer, Exxon Find U.S. Justices as Shareholders May Cost Them, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=aQhpG3  
GxU2TQ&refer=home (―Alito‘s stock holdings in Exxon Mobil were in the $100,001 to $250,000 
range, according to his 2006 disclosure form.‖). 
 403. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2611, 2619–34. 
 404. Id. at 2633. 
 405. Id. at 2627. 
 406. See id. at 2628 (―Instructions can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when 
awards are not tied to specifically proven items of damage . . . .‖). 
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the changes wrought by inflation,
407
 Justice Souter and the four who joined 
his opinion—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas—held that a ratio between compensatory and punitive damages 
was the best solution.
408
 To set the ratio, the Court consulted statistics 
across a wide range of punitive damage awards that set the national median 
ratio at less than 1:1.
409
 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a 1:1 ratio 
―is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.‖410 
Justice Stevens‘s dissent provided the lengthiest disagreement with the 
majority.
411
 Although he acknowledged the Court‘s power to set a ratio,412 
he argued that it was more prudent for Congress to take the lead in setting 
mathematical ratios, quoting a prior case noting that ―maritime tort law is 
now dominated by federal statute.‖413 While Justice Ginsburg agreed with 
Justice Stevens that the Court had the power to set a ratio, and while she 
thought that leaving it for Congress was a better choice, she acknowledged 
that ―the question is close.‖414 Justice Ginsburg also noted the majority‘s 
conclusion that runaway punitive damages awards were not a widespread 
problem and argued that abuse of discretion review would presumably 
suffice in dealing with outlier awards.
415
 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg added 
that a firm 1:1 ratio, while appropriate in this case, may not be appropriate 
in every future case.
416
 Finally, Justice Breyer found himself in unfamiliar 
territory as a dissenter in a punitive damages case.
417
 Justice Breyer‘s 
primary objection to the majority‘s opinion was its ―absolute fixed 
numerical ratio.‖418 He cited the Court‘s prior punitive damages holdings 
to note that the Court had left the door open in the past for limited 
exceptions to its numerical ratios,
419
 and in this particular case, argued that 
―a limited exception to the Court‘s 1:1 ratio is warranted.‖420 
                                                                                                                     
 407. See id. at 2629 (noting also the problem ―that there is no ‗standard‘ tort or contract 
injury‖). 
 408. See id. 
 409. See id. at 2633 (noting specifically that the appropriate number was around 0.65:1, 
meaning that compensatory damages awards on average are approximately one-third higher than 
punitive damage awards). 
 410. Id. 
 411. See id. at 2634 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 412. See id. at 2638. 
 413. Id. at 2635 (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990)).  
 414. See id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 415. See id. (―The Court acknowledges that the traditional approach ‗has not mass-produced 
runaway awards,‘ or endangered settlement negotiations. Nor has the Court asserted that outlier 
awards, insufficiently checked by abuse-of-discretion review, occur more often or are more 
problematic in maritime cases than in other areas governed by federal law.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 416. See id. (―In the end, is the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime-law ceiling, or is it 
also signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held to exceed ‗the constitutional outer limit‘? 
On next opportunity, will the Court rule, definitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling due process requires in 
all of the States, and for all federal claims?‖ (citation omitted)). 
 417. See id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. (―In setting forth constitutional due process limits on the size of punitive damages 
awards, for example, we said that ‗few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
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IV.  DECONSTRUCTING AND RECONSTRUCTING: WHAT IS THE STATE OF 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, AND 
WHERE WILL THE COURT GO NEXT? 
In the wake of Philip Morris, one could not be blamed for wondering 
whether the dissenting Justices are correct that the Court‘s ―changing, less 
than crystalline precedent‖421 is ―insusceptible of principled 
application.‖422 Several other questions come to mind. Does the Court‘s 
decision to dispose of Philip Morris on procedural, rather than substantive, 
due process signal a shift in the Court‘s approach to reviewing punitive 
damages cases? What, if anything, do Philip Morris and Exxon tell us 
about the punitive damages jurisprudence of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito? Does the Court‘s new due process rule that prohibits a 
defendant from being punished for harm caused to nonparties make any 
progress toward resolving the multiple punishments problem? What does 
the Court‘s decision to avoid the substantive due process question raised 
by Philip Morris on its final petition for certiorari, as well as its ultimate 
dismissal of the remaining question raised as improvidently granted, say 
about the future of punitive damages jurisprudence before the Court? 
Likewise, what, if anything, does the Court‘s refusal to consider the due 
process ramifications of the $2.5 billion punitive damages award in Exxon 
tell us about the future of the Court‘s involvement in punitive damages 
cases? Finally, how will the addition of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan 
influence this future? These and other questions are addressed below. 
A.  Procedural v. Substantive Due Process 
As discussed above, Haslip was the Court‘s first due process case in 
the punitive damages realm.
423
 Because the issue in Haslip was how the 
jury was instructed, the Court analyzed the case on procedural due process 
grounds.
424
 In contrast, in TXO, the issue was whether the punitive 
damages award itself was ―grossly excessive,‖ i.e., whether the award was 
too big.
425
 Accordingly, TXO was analyzed under substantive due process 
grounds. Therefore, one can divine a dividing line between when 
procedural due process governs and when substantive due process 
                                                                                                                     
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.‘‖ (emphasis added) 
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)). 
 420. Id. (arguing he could ―find no reasoned basis to disagree with the Court of Appeals‘ 
conclusion that this is a special case, justifying an exception from strict application of the majority‘s 
numerical rule‖). 
 421. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. 
 422. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 423. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 424. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–24 (1991). 
 425. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993). 
54
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/2
2011] THE SUPREME COURT (FINALLY) BUTTS OUT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR GOOD 579 
 
governs: questions relating to how the jury does its work, including how 
the jury is instructed and what evidence it is allowed to consider, implicate 
procedural due process, whereas questions relating to how big the award is 
(i.e., whether the award was grossly excessive) implicate substantive due 
process. Using this dividing line, then, both Gore and State Farm might 
superficially seem to be quintessential substantive due process cases 
because the opinions seemed to revolve around the three-pronged ―gross 
excessiveness‖ inquiry. And since Philip Morris seemed to involve little 
more than an extension and clarification of the analysis in both of those 
previous cases, it too might facially seem to be a substantive due process 
case, rendering Justice Breyer‘s pronouncements to the contrary426 to be 
disingenuous. A more nuanced look at Gore and State Farm, however, 
reveals that, while embedded in a substantive due process framework, the 
pivotal analysis in both of those cases actually concerned procedural, and 
not substantive, matters. In fact, a strong case can be made for the 
contention that both Gore and State Farm could have (and should have) 
been resolved solely on procedural due process grounds as the Court 
purported to do in Philip Morris.
427
 
As previously discussed, Justice Breyer was careful both at the 
beginning of the majority opinion
428
 and at the end
429
 to make clear that the 
Court‘s decision revolved around procedural, rather than substantive, due 
process. In dissent, both Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens were critical 
of this characterization, arguing that the majority opinion was more 
properly characterized as a substantive due process case.
430
 Justice 
Thomas‘s criticism was open, direct, and consistent with his prior 
criticisms of the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence431 and merits no 
further discussion. On the other hand, Justice Stevens‘s criticism is more 
tempered and seems to argue a bit too vigorously a point not openly in 
dispute—that the Court‘s prior substantive due process punitive damages 
cases are still valid law in the wake of Philip Morris.
432
 So why the dispute 
about whether procedural or substantive due process is driving the 
decision? Who is right? Does it matter? 
In the view of this author, there are three plausible explanations for 
how the Philip Morris case played out (at least prior to its decision to 
vacate certiorari on the final appeal as improvidently granted) and why it 
played out that way. The first is that the status quo was preserved, while 
                                                                                                                     
 426. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007). 
 427. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 428. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353 (―Because we shall not decide whether the award here 
at issue is ‗grossly excessive,‘ we need now only consider the Constitution‘s procedural 
limitations.‖). 
 429. See id. at 358 (―Because the application of this standard may lead to the need for a new 
trial, or a change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not consider whether the 
award is constitutionally ‗grossly excessive.‘‖). 
 430. See supra notes 367–68 and accompanying text. 
 431. See supra notes 368–70 and accompanying text. 
 432. See supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
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the second and third signal a contraction in the scope of the Court‘s view 
of its role in punitive damages jurisprudence in the years to come. 
The first explanation is that, notwithstanding the criticisms leveled by 
Justices Stevens and Thomas, the Court‘s decision was in fact based solely 
on procedural due process, and the Court‘s decision to avoid substantive 
due process was based upon legitimate prudential considerations.
433
 The 
second is that Justices Roberts and Alito are flatly unwilling to recognize a 
substantive due process limitation on the size of punitive damages awards, 
placing them squarely in the camp with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg.
434
 And the third is that while Justices Roberts and Alito are 
willing to go along with the recognition of such a substantive due process 
limitation, they are unwilling to expand that limitation beyond the scope of 
the prior cases.
435
 Each of these possible interpretations of the Court‘s due 
process characterization is discussed below. 
1.  Substantive Due Process Was Simply Not Implicated and Is 
Alive and Well 
The first possible interpretation of Philip Morris is that we should take 
the case at face value and assume that nothing whatsoever has changed 
about the Court‘s approach to substantive due process. This approach to 
Philip Morris would argue that the Court‘s failure to overrule (or even 
criticize) Gore and State Farm should be interpreted to mean that those 
cases are not only still good law, but that the Court will continue to be 
vigilant about assuring that juries do not issue (and courts do not affirm) 
grossly excessive punitive damages awards. Because Justice Stevens 
remained firmly committed to substantive due process in this context,
436
 
and because Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Souter were also firmly on 
board with this concept,
437
 all it would have taken was for either Chief 
Justice Roberts or Justice Alito to join this foursome, and there would have 
been the necessary five votes to continue the Court‘s jurisprudential 
approach to punitive damages. And because both Justices joined the 
majority in Philip Morris, which neither overruled nor questioned Gore or 
State Farm, one might be tempted to assume that the status quo was 
preserved. This reading gives credence to Justice Breyer‘s contention in 
Philip Morris that the Court declines to reach the substantive due process 
issue solely for prudential reasons.
438
 But based upon how the case played 
out after it was remanded, this simply cannot be the case. 
As previously discussed, on remand, the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed the $79.5 million punitive damages award on the ground that 
procedural due process was not denied to Philip Morris when its proposed 
                                                                                                                     
 433. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
 434. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 435. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
 436. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
 437. All three Justices had been in the majority in both Gore and State Farm. See supra note 
103 and accompanying text; supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
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jury instruction was rejected.
439
 It is important to remember that certiorari 
was initially granted in Philip Morris on both procedural and substantive 
due process grounds.
440
 Given the majority‘s express declaration that it 
need not reach the substantive due process question because the award 
needed to be vacated on procedural due process grounds,
441
 this squarely 
placed before the Court the substantive due process issue. But the Court 
blinked—twice. First, the Court blinked when it declined to re-grant 
certiorari on substantive due process following the affirmance by the 
Oregon Supreme Court.
442
 Second, the Court blinked when, during oral 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts raised the possibility of subjecting the 
award to substantive due process scrutiny and then quickly backed away.
443
 
Given that the punitive damages award in this case was nearly 100 
times greater than the compensatory damages award, and given State 
Farm‘s admonition that only single-digit multipliers would likely comply 
with substantive due process, it strains credulity to believe that Philip 
Morris simply maintains the status quo. A simple application of the Gore 
guideposts would surely have led to the award in Philip Morris being 
struck down.  
2.  Substantive Due Process Review of Punitive Damages Is Dead 
Though not immediately apparent from Philip Morris, it may be that 
the best explanation of the majority‘s decision to characterize the due 
process problem with the case as procedural rather than substantive is that 
there were no longer five Justices willing to continue to recognize 
substantive due process limitations in the punitive damages context. 
Prior to being elevated to the Supreme Court, both Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito were universally regarded as judicial 
conservatives.
444
 Among the other seven Justices then on the bench, it is 
uncontroversial to say that Justices Scalia and Thomas are widely 
considered the two most conservative members of the Court and are also 
commonly characterized as judicial conservatives. As discussed 
previously, both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas adamantly oppose the 
Court‘s substantive due process punitive damages jurisprudence,445 while 
both have previously joined opinions recognizing and applying procedural 
due process constraints in punitive damages cases.
446
 (Justice Ginsburg 
                                                                                                                     
 439. See supra Part III.C. 
 440. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra note 359 and accompanying text. 
 442. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra notes 392–93 and accompanying text. 
 444. See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Roberts Would Swing the Supreme Court to the Right, 
BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=alGK4  
Jy5eXwc; Bill Mears, Alito‟s Record Shows Conservative Judge, CNNPOLITICS.COM (Oct. 31, 
2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-10-31/politics/alito.record_1_abortion-laws-chief-justice-john-
roberts-judicial-philosophy?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
 445. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 446. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434–35 (1994) (invalidating a 
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also dissented in both Gore and State Farm and has been sharply critical of 
the Court‘s substantive due process punitive damages jurisprudence.)447 
Accordingly, one might reasonably expect that with the addition of Justices 
Roberts and Alito, five members of the Court would be ready to scuttle the 
Court‘s substantive due process punitive damages jurisprudence in its 
entirety, which would, of course, mean overruling Gore and (at least to 
some degree) State Farm.
448
 Indeed, that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito are uncomfortable with substantive due process in the punitive 
damages context is perhaps the best explanation of why and how the case 
unfolded the way it did, and why the majority opinion in Philip Morris, 
which included both Justices Roberts and Alito in its bare five-Justice 
majority, discussed only procedural due process, avoiding venturing into 
substantive due process territory. An important lens through which to 
examine the majority opinion is the dissent of Justice Stevens. 
Justice Stevens begins his dissent with a straightforward and seemingly 
uncontroversial statement to the effect that the Due Process Clause 
imposes both procedural and substantive limitations on states‘ power to 
impose punitive damages, citing each of the Court‘s punitive damages 
cases over the past fifteen years.
449
 Curiously, Justice Stevens then declares 
with unnecessary vigor, ―I remain firmly convinced that the cases 
announcing those constraints were correctly decided,‖450 as if he were 
responding to a statement in the majority opinion calling those cases into 
question. One searches in vain in the text or footnotes of that opinion for 
any such statement.
451
 Later, in the penultimate paragraph of his dissent, 
Justice Stevens again tilts at the proverbial windmill, declaring ―[i]t is far 
too late in the day to argue that the Due Process Clause merely guarantees 
fair procedure and imposes no substantive limits on a State‘s lawmaking 
power.‖452 It is far too late for whom to be arguing this? The majority 
opinion did not make such a claim; it simply (and expressly) did not reach 
this question because it resolved the case on procedural due process 
grounds.
453
 Not even Williams argued that due process did not contain a 
substantive element that constrained the size of punitive damages awards. 
The only ones making this claim are the three other dissenting Justices—
Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas—and it seems rather unlikely that 
Justice Stevens would be directing this point at his fellow dissenters. 
                                                                                                                     
punitive damages award on procedural due process grounds). 
 447. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607–14 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 430–39 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Honda, 512 U.S. at 436–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 448. I say ―to some degree‖ because, as discussed above, State Farm easily could have been 
decided solely on procedural due process grounds. See supra notes 172–95 and accompanying text. 
 449. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358–59 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 450. Id. at 358. 
 451. Indeed, why would there be? The opinion was written by Justice Breyer, who was in the 
majority in both Gore and State Farm. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also supra 
note 169 and accompanying text. 
 452. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 360–61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 453. See supra note 438 and accompanying text. 
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So to whom is he addressing his comments? Because Justices Breyer, 
Kennedy, and Souter have consistently sided with the majority in the 
Court‘s previous punitive damages cases (recognizing substantive due 
process in the punitive damages context), the most logical conclusion is 
that this was directed at the two new Justices—Roberts and Alito, who had 
joined the Court since State Farm. 
While we have no way of knowing this (and we may never know), it is 
possible (perhaps even likely) that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
made clear to the other Justices that they believed the Court‘s substantive 
due process decisions in the punitive damages realm were incorrectly 
decided and that they would side with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Ginsburg if forced to decide the case on substantive due process grounds. 
Both the majority opinion and Justice Stevens‘ dissent are consistent with 
this hypothesis. The majority is consistent in that it grounds the case in 
procedural due process and declines to venture into substantive due 
process, and Justice Stevens‘s dissent is consistent because it raises a 
somewhat spirited defense of substantive due process even though it has 
not been openly attacked. 
Further buttressing this hypothesis (at least to some degree) is the 
Court‘s decision, within months of deciding Philip Morris, to exclude from 
its review of the staggering $2.5 billion punitive damages award in Exxon 
the defendant‘s challenge that such an award was grossly excessive in 
violation of substantive due process.
454
 Even more support is found in the 
fact that the Court denied certiorari in Philip Morris after the affirmance on 
remand by the Oregon Supreme Court on the very same substantive due 
process question on which it had previously granted review.
455
 
Cutting against this hypothesis, however, is the fact that Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito signed on to the majority opinion in Philip 
Morris even though it suggested the Court‘s approval of prior substantive 
due process cases: ―For these and similar reasons, this Court has found that 
the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for 
awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as ‗grossly 
excessive.‘‖456 This facial support for substantive due process, however, 
seems tepid and carefully worded such that there is room to argue that this 
was simply an acknowledgement, rather than a reaffirmance, of the prior 
precedents. The unnatural wording of the very next sentence in the opinion 
further fuels such speculation: ―Because we shall not decide whether the 
award here at issue is ‗grossly excessive,‘ we need now only consider the 
Constitution‘s procedural limitations.‖457 Why ―shall not decide‖? If 
substantive due process were alive and well, Justice Breyer seemingly 
should have reversed the order of the sentence to say instead: ―Because we 
find the punitive damages award to violate procedural due process, we 
need not decide whether the award here at issue is ‗grossly excessive.‖‘ 
                                                                                                                     
 454. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 398, at *i. 
 455. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 456. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 353 (citing, inter alia, State Farm and Gore).  
 457. Id. 
59
Gash: The End Of An Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punit
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
584 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
Perhaps cutting once again the other way, but only slightly, is the more 
natural wording in the final paragraph of the majority opinion: ―Because 
the application of this standard may lead to the need for a new trial, or a 
change in the level of the punitive damages award, we shall not consider 
whether the award is constitutionally ‗grossly excessive.‘‖458 Again, why 
―shall not‖ rather than ―need not‖? 
It is no answer to argue that if either or both Chief Justice Roberts or 
Justice Alito had agreed with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg that a 
substantive due process review of punitive damages awards was improper, 
all they had to do was join their dissents in Philip Morris. It is important to 
remember that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito disagreed with 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg on the procedural due process 
point, and thus, it would have been exceedingly awkward for them to join 
the majority opinion while at the same time pledging allegiance to a 
viewpoint expressed in dissent. 
In summary, while it is not possible to ascertain from Philip Morris 
with any certainty whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito consider 
substantive due process illegitimate in the punitive damages realm, there is 
ample reason to believe that they are not eager to wield its power more 
than is absolutely necessary, which suggests that the third alternative of 
Philip Morris is likely the correct one. 
3.  The Court Has Said All It Cares to Say About Substantive Due 
Process 
The third possible explanation of the majority‘s opinion is that, while 
Justices Roberts and Alito are not fond of the Court‘s substantive due 
process jurisprudence, they (1) are unwilling to overrule the Court‘s 
substantive due process cases, and (2) do not intend to revisit this line of 
cases. 
As discussed in the immediately prior section, there are good reasons to 
believe that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are not entirely 
comfortable with the Court‘s substantive due process jurisprudence in the 
punitive damages realm.
459
 Yet had they affirmatively wanted to overrule 
this line of cases, either Philip Morris or Exxon would have provided a 
perfect vehicle for accomplishing that task. Both involved large punitive 
damages awards against unpopular defendants (tobacco and oil), and the 
defendants in both cases sought to have the awards overturned as ―grossly 
excessive‖ in violation of substantive due process. Yet, the Justices let the 
opportunity go. Again, it can certainly be argued that they initially 
sidestepped this issue on prudential grounds.
460
 But there is no 
immediately obvious reason why cases such as Philip Morris should be 
resolved on procedural due process grounds, if possible, so as to avoid 
deciding them on substantive due process grounds. Both grounds are 
                                                                                                                     
 458. Id. at 358. 
 459. See supra notes 454–58 and accompanying text. 
 460. See supra note 438 and accompanying text. 
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constitutionally based, and no case law seems to exist instructing courts to 
avoid substantive due process when procedural due process will suffice. 
It would have been equally defensible for the Court to avoid the 
procedural due process grounds by deciding the case solely on substantive 
due process grounds. Indeed, a straightforward application of the Gore 
factors very well could have led to the award being overturned because the 
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (roughly 100:1)
461
 was way too 
high. Such an approach would have obviated the need to create a new 
constitutional rule, which is precisely what Justice Stevens scolded the 
majority for doing.
462
 
Accordingly, perhaps the most natural interpretation of Philip Morris 
(and the Court‘s refusal to review Exxon on substantive due process 
grounds) is that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are neither inclined 
to overrule the substantive due process punitive damages cases nor to 
expand their reach. In fact, it seems fair to say that the Court, given its 
current makeup,
463
 will no longer take punitive damages cases even if they 
do not comply with the Gore guideposts. 
This conclusion that the Supreme Court is done with substantive due 
process in the punitive damages realm is supported by at least three points. 
First, as discussed below, the Court appears to have completed its creation 
of a punitive damages structure that it believes sufficiently avoids the 
multiple punishments problem.
464
 If a defendant can be punished only for 
the harm caused to the plaintiff, or so the argument goes, then there is no 
longer a risk of multiple punishments for the same conduct. But as also 
discussed below, this guarantee is illusory, and its premise ignores 
centuries of punitive damages jurisprudence.
465
 Nevertheless, since the 
Supreme Court‘s recent involvement in punitive damages has been driven 
by its concern with the multiple punishments problem,
466
 there is good 
reason to believe that the Court will no longer inject itself into this area. 
Second, if the Court were at all inclined to continue evaluating punitive 
damages on substantive due process grounds, why did it excise that issue 
from Exxon at the point it granted certiorari? After all, if the case turned 
out to be resolvable on other grounds, the Court could have simply 
declined to reach the substantive due process claim as it did in Philip 
Morris. If, on the other hand, the case had not turned out to be resolvable 
on other grounds, the Court had prevented itself from invalidating the 
award on substantive due process grounds. Accordingly, by refusing to 
allow the parties even to brief this issue, the Court seems to have been 
                                                                                                                     
 461. See Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 351. 
 462. See id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As discussed below, the multiple punishments 
problem was likely an additional driving force in the Court‘s decision to avoid substantive due 
process. 
 463. At the time of this writing, the Court consists of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 
 464. See infra Part IV.B. 
 465. See infra Part IV.B. 
 466. See supra notes 189, 339–43 and accompanying text. 
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signaling that it had said all it was going to say on substantive due process 
in the punitive damages realm.
467
 
Third, if the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito did not 
cause a change in the Court‘s approach, it almost certainly would have 
reached the merits of the substantive due process claim even though the 
case was resolvable on procedural due process grounds—just as it had 
done in both Gore and State Farm. 
In Gore, which is widely regarded as a substantive due process case,
468
 
the Court explained that punitive damages awards ―must be supported by 
the State‘s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own 
economy.‖469 Because the jury in Gore was permitted, indeed 
encouraged,
470
 to punish BMW for lawful out-of-state conduct,
471
 the 
Court declared that federalism principles did not permit punishment 
through punitive damages of ―conduct that is lawful in other 
jurisdictions.‖472 Because this relates to how the jury reached its punitive 
damages award, rather than how big that award was, this was a procedural 
due process shortcoming and easily could have served as an independent 
and adequate basis for invalidating the award and remanding it back to the 
state from which it came (without ever reaching the substantive due 
process issue), as was done in Philip Morris. But that did not happen. 
Instead, the Court proceeded to the next question of whether the 
punitive damages award, even after it was remitted by the Alabama 
Supreme Court, was ―grossly excessive‖ in violation of substantive due 
process.
473
 As discussed previously, it was at this point that the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 467. Another important aspect of Exxon that made it even less attractive to the Court is that the 
multiple punishments problem was not, and could not have been, implicated. This is true because in 
Exxon, a class action for punitive damages was certified, see Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. 
Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008), making it impossible for Exxon to be subject to multiple punitive damages 
awards for the act or course of conduct that gave rise to that case. 
 468. See, e.g., Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 443 (Kan. 2006) 
(―Since 1996, in Gore and Campbell, the Supreme Court has addressed excessive punitive damages 
as a matter of substantive due process.‖); Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO 
L. REV. 1501, 1509 (1999) (stating that Gore ―was very much a substantive due process decision‖); 
Redish & Mathews, supra note 70, at 9 (―[A]s framed in Gore, the Court‘s inquiry is entirely one of 
economic substantive due process . . . .‖); Stekloff, supra note 125, at 1797 (―In BMW v. Gore, the 
United States Supreme Court struck down a punitive damages award because it was ‗grossly 
excessive‘ and therefore an arbitrary deprivation of property in violation of the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖).  
 469. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). 
 470. Id. at 564 (―Dr. Gore introduced evidence that since 1983 BMW had sold 983 refinished 
cars as new, including 14 in Alabama . . . . Using the actual damage estimate of $4,000 per vehicle, 
Dr. Gore argued that a punitive award of $4 million would provide an appropriate penalty for 
selling approximately 1,000 cars for more than they were worth.‖). 
 471. Id. at 572–73. 
 472. Id.  
 473. Id. at 574–75. It may be plausible to argue that the reason the Court did stop in its 
analysis after finding what amounts to a procedural due process violation, instead of proceeding to 
the substantive due process analysis, is that the Alabama Supreme Court, recognizing the 
procedural due process violation, reduced the punitive damages award, taking into account only 
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created the guidepost framework designed to measure whether an award is 
―grossly excessive‖ in violation of substantive due process.474 
Following closely on Gore‘s analytical heels, State Farm, another case 
that is widely viewed as a substantive due process case,
475
 took the judicial 
baton and expanded upon Gore‘s procedural due process reasoning. While 
Gore had made clear that lawful out-of-state conduct could not be punished 
through punitive damages,
476
 it did not answer the question of whether 
unlawful out-of-state conduct could be similarly punished.
477
 (Once again, 
this relates to how the jury reached its punitive damages award—a 
procedural due process matter.) Justice Kennedy‘s opinion in State Farm 
initially skirted this open question by pointing out that the plaintiffs in 
State Farm conceded that much of the out-of-state conduct introduced into 
evidence at the trial ―was lawful where it occurred.‖478 Then, relying on 
―basic principle[s] of federalism,‖ Justice Kennedy effectively closed the 
door on the prospect of punishment for even unlawful out-of-state conduct: 
―[E]ach State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is 
permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can 
determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant 
who acts within its jurisdiction.‖479 But Justice Kennedy did not stop there. 
He then relied upon ―a more fundamental reason‖ (than even federalism)—
due process.
480
 In explaining the due process concerns, Justice Kennedy 
declared that ―[a] defendant‘s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts 
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive 
damages.‖481 This declaration does two things that are important here. 
First, it essentially moots the federalism question by taking the location of 
the prior conduct out of the equation entirely—if the conduct is dissimilar, 
it matters not where it occurred because dissimilar conduct as a class 
cannot serve as the basis for punitive damages. Second, it begs the question 
of whether similar conduct may serve as the basis for punitive damages. 
Because the Court found that the plaintiffs had ―shown no conduct by State 
Farm similar to that which harmed them,‖482 Justice Kennedy had no 
occasion to answer this question directly. He did, however, provide a clear 
                                                                                                                     
harm to Alabama citizens. Had the Court not been intent on announcing a new substantive due 
process guidepost framework, however, the Court still could have remanded the case back to the 
Alabama Supreme Court with instructions for it to order a new trial without the evidence of out-of-
state harm. 
 474. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 475. See, e.g., Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 443 (2006) (―Since 
1996, in Gore and Campbell, the Supreme Court has addressed excessive punitive damages as a 
matter of substantive due process.‖); Redish & Mathews, supra note 70, at 11 (claiming that State 
Farm ―added another chapter to the substantive due process story of punitive damages‖). 
 476. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). 
 477. See Gash, supra note 9, at 1639. 
 478. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003). 
 479. Id. at 422. 
 480. Id. at 422–23. 
 481. Id. 
 482. Id. at 424. 
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signal as to how this question would be answered—a signal that Justice 
Breyer received loudly and clearly as he was writing the majority opinion 
in Philip Morris. 
This signal came in the form of two critical sentences that would form 
the basis for the Philip Morris decision. These two sentences read as 
follows:  
Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of 
punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties‘ 
hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the 
reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah 
Supreme Court did that here. . . . Punishment on these bases 
creates the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards 
for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not 
bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.
483
 
While Justice Kennedy did not explicitly identify whether the ―due 
process‖ to which he refers is procedural or substantive, it is indisputable 
that he is referring to procedural due process because he is talking about 
how the jury reached its decision on the punitive damages award (i.e., what 
evidence the jury was allowed to consider), rather than how big the award 
was. 
Importantly, however, unlike in Philip Morris, the Court did not 
separate out this procedural due process analysis from the substantive due 
process analysis. Instead, this discussion was embedded within an analysis 
of the reprehensibility guidepost of the substantive due process ―gross 
excessiveness‖ inquiry.484 
In summary, the Court in both Gore and State Farm ultimately 
analyzed whether the size of the punitive damages award was ―grossly 
excessive.‖485 Once again, this is the quintessential substantive due process 
question, i.e., how big?
486
 But in both cases, the Court addressed the 
substantive due process question after determining that a procedural due 
process error had been committed, i.e., finding that the evidence and 
instructions given to the respective juries were inappropriate.
487
 In neither 
case, however, did the Court explicitly announce that its evaluation of the 
evidence and instructions given to the jury was a procedural (rather than 
substantive) due process issue. Nor was there any attempt to disaggregate 
the procedural due process analysis from the substantive due process 
analysis. 
Reframing the issue then, all three cases (Gore, State Farm, and Philip 
Morris) involved allegations of both procedural due process violations 
(how the jury reached its decision, i.e., what evidence it was allowed to 
consider and what instructions it was given), and substantive due process 
                                                                                                                     
 483. Id. at 423. 
 484. See id. at 422–24. 
 485. See supra Parts I.C.2–3 and accompanying text. 
 486. See supra notes 424–25 and accompanying text. 
 487. See supra Parts I.C.2–3 and accompanying text. 
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violations (how big the punitive damages award was, i.e., whether the 
award was ―grossly excessive‖). In both Gore and State Farm, the Court 
found violations of both procedural and substantive due process and 
explicitly addressed both aspects. In contrast, the Court in Philip Morris 
departed from its custom of analyzing both procedural and substantive due 
process and decided to stop its analysis after determining there was a 
procedural due process violation. Indeed, unlike in both Gore and State 
Farm, the Court in Philip Morris segregated its procedural due process 
analysis from (rather than embedding such analysis within) its substantive 
due process analysis so that it would be unnecessary to reach the latter 
question. 
This stark shift in approach can best (perhaps only) be explained by the 
change in the makeup of the Court, and signals that the Court, while not 
willing to abandon substantive due process altogether, has said all that it 
intends to say about substantive due process. This view is once again 
bolstered by the fact that it (1) declined to consider the substantive due 
process challenge in Exxon; and (2) declined to consider Philip Morris‘ 
substantive due process challenge even after the $79.5 million award was 
affirmed by the Oregon Supreme Court. 
An even more compelling reason to believe that the Court has entered a 
prolonged silent phase in its substantive due process jurisprudence is that 
the Court appears to believe that it has solved the multiple punishments 
problem, at least to the best of its limited ability. 
B.  Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem 
As previously discussed, the multiple punishments problem has been 
the unresolved issue driving the Supreme Court‘s punitive damages 
jurisprudence all along.
488
 It was alluded to in Gore when, under the 
substantive due process banner, the Court said that a defendant could not 
be punished for lawful out-of-state conduct but then left open the question 
of whether the out-of-state conduct had to be unlawful.
489
 This limitation 
had the effect of reducing the total number of nonparties harmed by the 
defendant‘s conduct for which the defendant could be punished consistent 
with due process. In other words, by eliminating those nonparties located 
out of state who were harmed by defendant‘s lawful conduct, the scope of 
the multiple punishments problem was reduced. 
The multiple punishments problem was further addressed in State 
Farm when, once again on substantive due process grounds, the Court 
clarified that a defendant could not be punished for out-of-state conduct 
even if it was unlawful.
490
 This limitation also had the effect of 
diminishing the scope of the multiple punishments problem by further 
reducing the number of nonparties harmed by the defendant‘s conduct for 
which the defendant could be punished—no longer could a defendant be 
                                                                                                                     
 488. See generally Gash, supra note 9, at 1631–34. 
 489. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
 490. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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punished for harm to out-of-state nonparties regardless of whether or not 
the defendant‘s conduct was legal. But the Court in State Farm was not 
done chipping away at the multiple punishments problem. The Court then 
added that the other acts that harmed nonparties could not be used to 
punish the defendant if those acts were dissimilar to the conduct at issue in 
the case before the court. Once again, this limitation further reduced the 
scope of the multiple punishments problem. In essence, then, a defendant 
could not be punished for harm caused to nonparties if the nonparties were 
out of state or (even if they were in state) if they had been injured by 
dissimilar conduct by the defendant. This prohibition on punishment for 
dissimilar conduct, of course, left open the question as to whether the other 
conduct could be punished at all, even if it was similar.
491
 
This set the stage for one final assault on the multiple punishments 
problem in Philip Morris. In that case, the Court declared that other acts 
that harmed nonparties, whether similar or dissimilar, could not be 
punished at all.
492
 Again, this further reduced the universe of harmed 
nonparties for which the defendant could be punished in the case before the 
court. Now, even harm to in-state nonparties caused by similar conduct 
could not, consistent with due process, be punished. 
The final swipe at the multiple punishments problem in Philip Morris 
was even more far reaching—due process did not even permit the 
defendant to be punished for harm to nonparties caused by the very same 
conduct that injured the plaintiff. Accordingly, when all was said and done, 
the Court had not only reduced the scope of the conduct for which the 
defendant could be punished to only the conduct at issue in the case, but it 
also reduced the universe of individuals whom the defendant could be 
punished for harming to only the party bringing the action. Needless to say, 
over the course of three cases, the Court dealt a substantial blow to the 
multiple punishments problem. 
While the Court‘s solution may serve to reduce the multiple 
punishments problems, this solution is far from perfect. First, the Court‘s 
solution rests on the illusion that juries will be able to follow its proposed 
limiting instructions. Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Philip Morris, stated 
that the distinction the Court draws between considering harm to 
nonparties in the reprehensibility analysis and not considering it when 
computing damages to directly punish the defendant is a ―nuance [that] 
eludes me.‖493 Practically speaking, if the nuance eludes a Supreme Court 
Justice, it can be expected to elude the vast majority of jurors as well. This 
is not a minor point. Before the Court can rest easy knowing its conceptual 
understanding of how to solve the multiple punishments problem is being 
implemented, it must necessarily develop a framework ―so that courts can 
                                                                                                                     
 491. See supra notes 185–93 and accompanying text. 
 492. See supra notes 344–57 and accompanying text. 
 493. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 360 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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reach consistent and predictable results.‖494 Accordingly, while the Court‘s 
final word in Philip Morris purports to be a solution, it is not a good one. 
Second, limiting the scope to the recovery of private wrongs runs 
counter to other competing theories of punitive damages. As a result, there 
may be other state interests in allowing punitive damages that the Court‘s 
framework does not take into account. For example, ―punitive damages 
have been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence, 
but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the 
redress of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the 
individual plaintiffs in a particular case.‖495 The Court‘s solution does not 
consider that states may have an interest in assessing punitive damages to 
vindicate public interests. Conversely, the polar opposite theory—that 
punitive damages should only consider harm to the individual plaintiff
496—
argues against the Court‘s idea of allowing the jury to consider harm to 
nonparties under the Gore ―reprehensibility‖ guidepost. Even though the 
Court distinguishes between considering harm to nonparties to establish 
reprehensibility and using it to punish the defendant, proponents of this 
theory of punitive damages still argue that any consideration of harm to 
anyone other than the individual plaintiff should not be considered.
497
 
Thus, on both ends of a theoretical spectrum that may periodically describe 
a particular state‘s interest in assessing punitive damages, the Court‘s 
solution is inadequate. 
C.  The Balance of Power on the Court 
Court prognosticators claim that the future of punitive damages 
jurisprudence is ―somewhat unstable and uncertain‖ because ―[t]hree 
Justices who favored the Court‘s current doctrine (Stevens, O‘Connor, and 
Souter) have retired, while three who solidly oppose it (Scalia, Thomas, 
and Ginsburg) remain on the Court.‖498 In all, there have been four new 
additions to the Court since the landmark State Farm decision, and the 
possibility that two or more of the newest members could choose to side 
with the regular punitive damages dissenters is worthy of consideration. 
But as discussed above, given the positions taken by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito in Philip Morris and Exxon, there is little reason to 
believe that either (much less, both) would join fellow conservatives, 
                                                                                                                     
 494. Gash, supra note 7, at 1267. 
 495. Sharkey, supra note 218, at 351–52. 
 496. See Colby, supra note 213, at 613–28; see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 315, at 
17–21. 
 497. See generally Gash, supra note 9, at 1643. 
 498. Goldstein, supra note 5; cf. Abigail Field, What Would a Justice Elena Kagan Mean 
For Business?, DAILYFINANCE.COM (May 10, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/investing  
/what-would-a-justice-elena-kagan-mean-for-business/19470758 (claiming that, ―Whatever position 
Kagan might take [on punitive damages] is strictly a guess at this point.‖). 
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, in reversing the current Court position.
499
 
Further, nothing indicates that either of the two newest members—Justice 
Sotomayor or Justice Kagan—(much less, both) share federalism concerns 
similar to Justice Ginsburg, and given the fact that both nominees were 
presented as left-leaning centrists, there is little reason to believe that either 
would move to reverse the Court‘s current position.500 These conclusions 
are reinforced by an understanding that the Court‘s current position 
purports to solve the multiple punishments problem, the issue that drove 
the Court‘s encroachment into punitive damages jurisprudence in the first 
place.
501
 
1.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
As previously discussed, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have 
already had the opportunity to join with the three regular punitive damages 
dissenters and overturn the current framework in Philip Morris; instead, 
both joined the majority in refusing to hear the case on substantive due 
process grounds.
502
 Moreover, even though Justice Stevens, a supporter of 
the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence prior to Philip Morris, could 
not go along with the opinion in Philip Morris and filed a dissent,
503
 both 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito signed on to the majority 
opinion.
504
 Further, when the Oregon Supreme Court refused to reduce the 
large award on remand, both were a part of the Court‘s decision to refuse a 
hearing on the ―gross excessiveness‖ inquiry, and ultimately to dismiss the 
entire petition as improvidently granted.
505
 Finally, although Justice Alito 
did not take part in the opinion set forth by the Court in Exxon due to his 
personal stock holdings in the Exxon Corporation,
506
 Chief Justice Roberts 
was once again a part of a Court that refused to consider a massive punitive 
damages award on substantive due process grounds.
507
 
In sum, although there is evidence that Justices Roberts and Alito are 
not wholehearted advocates of the Court‘s encroachment into the ability of 
the states to oversee punitive damages awards,
508
 their actions to date 
indicate that they are at least de facto supporters of the Court‘s overall 
framework and have no intentions of either reversing course or charting a 
new one. 
                                                                                                                     
 499. See supra Part IV.A.3. 
 500. See infra Parts IV.C.2–3. 
 501. See supra Part IV.B. 
 502. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
 503. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 504. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 505. See supra Part III.D. 
 506. See Stohr, supra note 402. 
 507. See supra Part III.E. 
 508. See supra Part IV.A. 
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2.  Justice Sotomayor 
Upon the nomination of Justice Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, those 
who closely follow punitive damages jurisprudence were understandably 
interested in her judicial track record on the subject. But the few cases 
involving punitive damages she heard as a judge in the Southern District of 
New York and while sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have 
led some to conclude that her views ―are largely a mystery, with her few 
rulings on the topic offering limited insight into how she would rule as a 
justice.‖509 Nonetheless, a close analysis of her record reveals that Justice 
Sotomayor will most likely do nothing to upset the punitive damages status 
quo. 
Those concerned about the size of damage awards were troubled to find 
three decisions in Justice Sotomayor‘s past where she upheld punitive 
damage awards. First, while chief judge in the Southern District of New 
York, in Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken,
510
 Sotomayor upheld a 
$1.25 million punitive damages award against a large Swedish banking 
corporation in a gender discrimination case under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.
511
 Second, while a member of a three-judge panel on the Second 
Circuit, in Moskowitz v. Coscette,
512
 she upheld a $75,000 punitive 
damages award in favor of a police officer against the chief of police and 
city government as a result of employment discrimination and free speech 
violations.
513
 And third, in Motorola v. Uzan,
514
 in an opinion written by 
Judge Guido Calabresi, then-Judge Sotomayor was a member of a three-
judge panel that upheld a massive $1 billion punitive damages award 
against a Turkish family corporation who successfully swindled $2 billion 
from Motorola by securing fraudulent loans.
515
 
Upon closer examination, however, these cases actually reveal rather 
little about how Justice Sotomayor would vote in a punitive damages case 
on the Supreme Court. First, in Greenbaum, Sotomayor adhered to the 
ratio established by the Supreme Court (here, 3.75:1),
516
 and after ensuring 
that the award was ―adequately related to the reprehensibility of the 
conduct,‖517 decided that the punitive award should not be reduced because 
the goal of deterrence demanded a sizeable award since the company 
declared it could pay any punitive award.
518
 Again, her opinion evidenced a 
                                                                                                                     
 509. See Stohr, supra note 22. 
 510. 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 511. See id. 
 512. No. 00-7671, 2001 WL 51009, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2001). 
 513. See id. 
 514. 509 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 515. See id. at 76–77. 
 516. See Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 517. Id. at 270. 
 518. See id. at 272. 
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sensitivity to the Court‘s established framework as applied to the facts of a 
particular case. Second, in Moskowitz, the Second Circuit‘s award of 
$75,000 did not ―shock the judicial conscience‖ in comparison to the 
$125,000 compensatory award.
519
 There is nothing in Moskowitz to 
indicate an attempt on the part of Justice Sotomayor to push for a large 
punitive damage agenda. And third, in Motorola, the original punitive 
award was $2 billion (in addition to another $2 billion in compensatory 
damages), and the award was reduced to $1 billion after the Second Circuit 
panel, which included Sotomayor, remanded it because the trial court had 
not demonstrated an analysis of the Gore factors.
520
 This approach not only 
evidences a commitment to the Court‘s constitutional analysis but also 
shows that Justice Sotomayor is not simply intent on maintaining large 
punitive awards.  
In addition to the weakness of the concerns raised by the instances 
where Justice Sotomayor upheld punitive awards in the past, there are 
additional reasons to believe that she would not act in a way that would 
threaten the status quo. First, in her Senate confirmation hearings, 
Sotomayor expressed her opinion that business needs law to be 
predictable,
521
 a view that is similar to Justice Souter‘s majority opinion in 
Exxon.
522
 Second, in a case rarely mentioned by those who commented 
about the cases in which she upheld punitive awards in the past, then-
District Chief Judge Sotomayor in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law 
Examiners ruled that the case did not warrant a punitive award at all.
523
 In 
Bartlett, where a bar applicant with a learning disability sued for violations 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Sotomayor awarded $12,500 in 
compensatory damages but found that ―[b]ecause of the ‗chaos‘ in the 
learning disability field and the ambiguity in the law, I do not find the level 
of ‗malice‘ or ‗reckless indifference‘ to federally protected rights that 
would justify an award of punitive damages.‖524 Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, there is literally no evidence in any of Justice Sotomayor‘s 
articles or opinions to indicate that she believes states should decide cases 
                                                                                                                     
 519. See Moskowitz v. Coscette, No. 00-7671, 2001 WL 51009, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2001). 
 520. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 509 F.3d 74, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 521. See Greg Stohr & William McQuillen, Sotomayor Hits Pro-Business Note in Senate 
Testimony (Update2) BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20  
601103&sid=aJ5Kg1jiULuQ (quoting Sotomayor as saying, ―‗In business, the predictability of law 
may be the most necessary‘. . . .‖). 
 522. See Curt Cutting, More on Sotomayor and Punitive Damages, CALIFORNIA PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES: AN EXEMPLARY BLOG (July 16, 2009, 10:07 AM), http://calpunitives.blogspot.com/20  
09/07/more-on-sotomayor-and-punitive-damages.html (―That statement echoes the reasoning of 
Justice Souter in his opinion for the majority in Exxon Shipping, in which he stated that a [sic] 
imposing a maximum one-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages eliminates 
arbitrary and unpredictable outcomes.‖). 
 523. 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 524. Id. at 1153. 
70
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/2
2011] THE SUPREME COURT (FINALLY) BUTTS OUT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR GOOD 595 
 
that heretofore have been considered under the federal due process 
framework. 
Finally, a 1996 law review article
525
 by Justice Sotomayor led some to 
claim that she rejects limits on punitive damages.  In the article, she said 
that ―bills that place arbitrary limits on jury verdicts in personal injury 
cases‖ are ―inconsistent with the premise of the jury system.‖526 However, 
upon careful reading of the context of the statements, it is clear that her 
remarks do not communicate an unwillingness to restrain jury verdicts—
Justice Sotomayor was simply arguing that properly restraining jury 
verdicts should be the province of the judiciary as opposed to the 
legislature.
527
 In short, her statement is illustrative of her views on the 
separation of powers instead of a preference for unrestrained punitive 
awards. 
In conclusion, a close examination of Justice Sotomayor reveals very 
little reason to believe that she would seek to change the course the Court 
has charted in regard to punitive damages. Instead, as some have already 
suggested, her position will most likely resemble the approach of Justice 
Stevens in this area of law.
528
 This will most likely lead her to be 
considered a centrist
529
 who maintains a middle ground on the issue.
530
 
3.  Justice Kagan 
Unlike Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan has no judicial track record to 
examine, making it more difficult, of course, to predict the  position she 
might take on punitive damages.
531
 In addition, despite a career in 
academics, she published relatively little, giving very few hints as to where 
she might stand on substantive legal issues.
532
 
In trying to read between the lines to predict where she might stand on 
issues affecting ―big business‖ (such as punitive damages), some have 
noted that during her time as solicitor general, Justice Kagan represented 
                                                                                                                     
 525. Sonia Sotomayor, Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35 (1996). 
 526. Id. at 46. 
 527. See id. at 46–47. 
 528. See Stohr, supra note 22 (citing punitive damages critic, Evan Tager, of Mayer Brown 
LLP in Washington, DC, in this regard). It is important to remember that although Justice Stevens 
dissented in Philip Morris, he went to great lengths to emphasize his belief that the Court‘s 
substantive due process framework established in both Gore and State Farm ―were correctly 
decided.‖ Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 529. See Levine & Francis, supra note 23. 
 530. See id. (―In class actions, Sotomayor has occupied a strict middle ground, her record 
reflecting sympathy neither for those in favor of such issues, nor skepticism of them. ‗She looks at 
each case on its unique facts to determine whether a class action is appropriate,‘ said [Evan] 
Tager.‖). 
 531. See Field, supra note 498 (―Whatever position Kagan might take on the[] issue[] [of 
punitive damages] is strictly a guess at this point.‖). 
 532. See id. 
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shareholders more often than did her predecessors, lending credibility to 
the thought that she might seek to defend large punitive damages 
awards.
533
 However, still others have noted that she worked for a corporate 
law firm early in her legal career where ―she had some socialization and 
training from the pro-big business perspective,‖ and further pointed out 
that business lawyers were openly positive about her potential appointment 
prior to her nomination.
534
 These mixed signals produce the popular 
conclusion that any prediction as to what position she would take on 
punitive damages is ―strictly a guess.‖535 
Justice Kagan‘s characterizations as a ―consensus builder‖536 and a 
―centrist‖537 are worthy of consideration, however. If these 
characterizations prove to be true, then it would naturally be less likely for 
her to seek to overturn a long line of precedent and establish a new 
punitive damages regime. Although a ―consensus builder‖ will discover 
both liberal and conservative Justices on both sides of punitive damages 
jurisprudence, it is the tendency to generate peace and stability that might 
lead a ―centrist‖ to prefer upholding the status quo in this area of the law. 
Consequently, although there is no reason to believe that Justice Kagan 
would adopt the positions advocated by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and 
Thomas, the mystery surrounding what Justice Kagan brings to the Court 
makes her the least predictable of the new Justices in regard to punitive 
damages. Still, even if she did find reason to join the regular dissenters in 
this area of the law, the call to return punitive damages to the states would 
still fall one vote shy of success.  
CONCLUSION 
Although wagering on the direction the Supreme Court will take on any 
issue is not an advisable way to earn a living, it still appears safe to 
characterize the future of the Court‘s punitive damages jurisprudence in 
light of the new composition as plus ça change, plus c‟est la même chose 
(―the more things change, the more they stay the same‖). The appearance of 
four new Justices since the landmark State Farm decision could obviously 
change its course if so desired, but a careful analysis of the new Justices 
along with the Court‘s ―fix‖ of the multiple punishments problem in Philip 
Morris combine to create a strong likelihood of a silent phase regarding 
punitive damages. 
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 537. See Gerstein, supra note 23. 
72
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/2
2011] THE SUPREME COURT (FINALLY) BUTTS OUT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR GOOD 597 
 
First, concerning both the substantive due process and procedural due 
process review frameworks it has created, the Court apparently believes it 
has nothing left to say on the issue. Second, there is no indication that any 
of the four new members of the Court (much less the necessary two) have 
any inclination to adopt the federalism concerns of Justices Ginsburg, 
Scalia, and Thomas that would necessarily precipitate a reversal of the 
course the Court has taken. 
The Supreme Court has apparently butted in for the last time in 
punitive damages jurisprudence. Despite witnessing a change in nearly half 
of the Court‘s membership, its future in regard to this area of the law will 
presumably remain the same. 
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